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INTRODUCTION
During oral argument in United States v. Texas, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito expressed—or feigned—confusion about the nature
of the status of non-citizens granted deferred action, respectively asking
the Solicitor General, incredulously, “Lawfully present does not mean
you’re legally present in the United States[?]”1 and “[H]ow is it possible
to lawfully work in the United States without lawfully being in the United

1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27:23-25, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016) (No. 15-674), https://perma.cc/N7GS-69C4.
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States?”2 The Solicitor General tried to explain to the conservative justices that “lawfully present” has a very non-literal meaning under immigration law, but without much success.3 He could have responded that
there is well-established precedent in American courts4 recognizing that
“[u]nlawful presence can be inconclusive in several ways. It can change,
it can occupy a gray area between lawful and unlawful, and its consequences are highly uncertain.”5 There is perhaps no more reflective an
example of this than the doctrine called “permanently residing under the
color of law,” abbreviated by the peculiar acronym PRUCOL.
Designed by the 92nd Congress, PRUCOL designates eligibility for
federal public benefits for those non-citizens whose status is “both outside
the law and inside the law.”6 PRUCOL, therefore, does not describe a
non-citizen’s immigration status but rather the public benefits eligibility
that a non-citizen enjoys as a product of their immigration status or lack
thereof. It is distinguished from two other immigrant eligibility categories: “qualified aliens”7 and “lawfully present” immigrants. Qualified aliens are lawful permanent residents, refugees, and those with similar
longer-term statuses,8 while lawfully present immigrants include those
with usually shorter-term statuses, such as temporary or non-immigrant
visa holders.9 The former category, along with PRUCOL, applies to several kinds of benefits, whereas the lawfully present category applies only
to health insurance under the Affordable Care Act. PRUCOL, however,
generally describes someone without immigration status or in the process
of obtaining such status.10 The PRUCOL doctrine was meant to be “adaptable and to be interpreted over time in accordance with experience, developments in the law, and the like”—that is, “organic and fluid, rather
than prescriptive or formulaic.”11 In other words, PRUCOL was designed
to be vague.
The vagueness of the doctrine creates challenges of applicability to
the real-world circumstances of non-citizens who are applying for public
assistance benefits, not just those who are before courts. The doctrine also
presents challenges for the social service agencies that must determine
2

Id. at 28:12-14.
Id. at 27:9-22, 29:6-16, 19-25.
4 See, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 (2d Cir. 1985); Holley v. Lavine, 553
F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977).
5 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 52 (2014).
6 Castillo v. Jackson, 566 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
7 Please note the term “alien” is used here as a direct quote of the law. The authors of
this article do not endorse the use of this term.
8 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2018).
9 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(i)-(iii) (2020).
10 See infra Part III.
11 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1571 (2d Cir. 1985).
3
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immigrant eligibility for said benefits, and also for attorneys who may
represent such individuals in immigration cases, public benefit cases, and
sometimes both.
This article aims to provide guidance for legal practitioners and representatives of PRUCOL non-citizens attempting to qualify for public assistance benefits in those limited jurisdictions that still use the PRUCOL
doctrine to determine benefit eligibility. Part I provides a history of the
doctrine. Part II provides a summary of the very limited scholarship on
the PRUCOL doctrine, noting that no comprehensive discussion of
PRUCOL has been written in the last two decades. Part III is a practitioner’s guide to applying the PRUCOL doctrine. It presents a taxonomy
of all judicial, and many administrative, decisions at the state and federal
level on the PRUCOL doctrine. Part III is meant to provide practitioners
with authority to support arguments for PRUCOL eligibility for realworld clients stuck “both outside and inside” the vague boundaries of lawful immigration status. Part IV concludes by encouraging practitioners to
use Part III to advance their arguments for PRUCOL client benefit access.
I.
A.

A HISTORY OF THE PRUCOL DOCTRINE

The Term “Color of Law”

The phrase “under color of law” goes back at least as far as the 13th
century, when it was used to describe those actions of state officials that
appeared to be authorized by law but were not.12 The phrase has been used
in American law since the 19th century, notably in civil rights statutes such
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a civil remedy for the deprivation
of constitutional rights perpetrated ‘under color of law’” or with its ostensible authorization.13 “Color” refers to that which seems to be lawful but
is not.14 In this context, the Supreme Court has defined “under color of law” as the “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law.”15
It is this part of the definition, “clothed with the authority of state
law,” that most applies to the phrase “color of law” as it is used in the

12

See Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323,
327 (1992).
13 See Sarah T. Biolsi, Civil Rights/Tax Law—”Under Color of” Internal Revenue Laws:
The Role of United States v. Temple and Section 7214 in the “Under Color of Law” Debate,
31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 117-21 (2009); see also Gillar v. Emp’t Div., 717 P.2d 131, 135
(Or. 1986) (en banc).
14 See Winter, supra note 12, at 327-28.
15 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
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PRUCOL doctrine.16 The Second Circuit has described such an action as
“that which an official does by virtue of power, as well as what he does
by virtue of right.”17 In the immigration law context, it is usually the execution of prosecutorial discretion that renders a non-citizen someone
who is residing under “color of law,” that is to say, clothed by the power
of the state with permission to remain in the United States, if not the legal
right to do so.18 In 1972, Congress first applied the “color of law” language to non-citizen recipients of the government’s discretionary permission to remain as a way of designating which non-citizens could enjoy
access to public assistance while they were permitted to remain in the
United States.
B.

The Statutory Origins of “PRUCOL”

The Supreme Court has treated decisions by the federal political
branches to deny public benefits to non-citizens as an inherent part of the
political branches’ “plenary power” over immigration policy.19 Congress
exercised that power in 1972 when it amended the Social Security Act to
create the first restriction of benefits based on citizenship status, excluding anyone who was not PRUCOL from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cash benefit program.20 As professor Janet M. Calvo explained in her 1987 article on non-citizen eligibility for federal
entitlements, lawmakers originally intended to restrict SSI to legal permanent residents, but some worried about states bearing the financial burden of caring for the disabilities of non-citizens who lacked permanent
residence but were still in the United States with the government’s permission.21 Calvo explained that senators from Florida addressed this problem by proposing an amendment that eventually became the intentionally

16

See a thorough discussion of the history of the “color of law” language as it applies to
the PRUCOL doctrine in Gillar, 717 P.2d at 135-37.
17 Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977).
18 E.g., id. (“[P]laintiff is in . . . a minuscule sub-class of aliens who, although unlawfully
residing in the United States, are each individually covered by a letter from the Department of
Justice stating that the Immigration and Naturalization Services ‘does not contemplate enforcing [their] departure from the United States at this time.’”); cf. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA,
BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7
(2015) (“A favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law identifies the
agency’s authority to refrain from asserting the full scope of the agency’s enforcement authority in a particular case.”).
19 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-83 (1976).
20 See Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 1614, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat.
1329, 1471; Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164, 1182 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
21 Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded Assistance Programs, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 411 (1987).
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broadly applicable “permanently residing in the United States under color
of law” status.22
Between the original enactment of Medicaid in 1965 and 1973, there
were actually no citizenship-based restrictions on Medicaid, the federal
public health insurance program for low-income people.23 At one point,
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the administrator of
Medicaid and predecessor of the Department of Health and Human Services) even recommended that the law stay that way.24 However, in 1973,
the Department implemented a new regulation placing restrictions on
non-citizen Medicaid eligibility.25 This first regulation on non-citizen eligibility limited non-emergency care to the PRUCOL category, borrowing its language straight from the SSI statute passed during the previous
year.26
The PRUCOL restriction on Medicaid eligibility was a mere regulation, and Congress did not pass a statute to apply the PRUCOL restriction
to non-emergency Medicaid until 1986, when the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act codified the Medicaid PRUCOL restriction into federal
law.27 As the House Budget Committee report expressly said, “The Committee intends that the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] and the
States broadly interpret the phrase ‘under color of law’ to include all of
the categories recognized by immigration law, policy and practice in effect at the time.”28
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”)—called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) after 1996—is a cash
entitlement program for low-income adults with children who did not become subject to PRUCOL restrictions until 1981.29 Thus, AFDC became
22

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B)(i) (2018)).
See Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1211 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Lewis, 663 F. Supp.
at 1181-82 (referring to 1973 as the beginning of federal citizenship requirements for Medicaid
eligibility and discussing a 1972 proposal that would have outright banned such citizenship
requirements for state Medicaid plans).
24 Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 1182 (“In fact, on June 16, 1972, the Secretary proposed a regulation that would require rejection of any state Medicaid plan that would ‘exclude an otherwise eligible individual on the basis . . . of his alien status’”) (quoting 37 Fed. Reg. 1977
(1972)).
25 See Grinker, 965 F.2d at 1211-13 (discussing the evolution of citizenship requirements
for Medicaid in light of Congressional amendments to the SSI program and the codification
of such exclusions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986).
26 See Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 1182 (citing language incorporated in 42 C.F.R. § 435.402
as originating from the SSI’s alienage requirement in the Social Security Amendments of
1972).
27 H.R. REP. NO. 99-727, at 111 (1986).
28 Id.
29 45 C.F.R. § 233.50(b); see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No
97-35, § 2320(a), 95 Stat. 357; Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 1182.
23
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the fourth entitlement program to be set by the PRUCOL designation. It
likewise borrowed the PRUCOL language from its SSI and Medicaid regulation predecessors.30 The Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program
(“SNAP”), more colloquially known as food stamps,31 is one of the few
major federal benefit programs that does not currently use the PRUCOL
standard for determining eligibility.32
By 1977, the Department of Labor administered the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (“FUTA”), the program that exacts a tax from employers to pay for unemployment insurance for employees who lose their jobs,
with the same PRUCOL restrictions.33 The federal law required state recipients of FUTA money to enact, among other provisions, identical
PRUCOL restrictions in their equivalent state laws.34
C. The First PRUCOL Cases: Holley v. Lavine and Berger v. Heckler
It was only a matter of time before the PRUCOL benefit eligibility
category, crafted with such vague language, would land in a federal court
where the parties could contest—and for the first time define—what
PRUCOL meant and to whom it referred. That time came in 1977, when
the Second Circuit decided the seminal PRUCOL case of Holley v. Lavine
and for the first time articulated a definition of PRUCOL.35 Holley was
followed by Berger v. Heckler, which built substantially on Holley’s definition.36 Together the two cases formed the PRUCOL doctrine and have
been relied upon by dozens of courts37 in cases where the definition of
who is and is not PRUCOL has continued to take shape.

30 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No 97-35, § 2320(a), 95 Stat.
357; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B) (2018).
31 See, for example, the U.S. Census Bureau’s equivalent treatment of the two names in
the agency’s FAQ section. Food Stamps/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/9KC5-BR27 (last visited May 17, 2020).
32 Robert Rubin, Walking a Gray Line: The “Color of Law” Test Governing Noncitizen
Eligibility for Public Benefits, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 411, 420, 420 n.53 (1987).
33 For a discussion of the history of FUTA as a whole and how it pertains to the PRUCOL
doctrine, see Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 324-26 (Ill. 1992); see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a)(14)(A) (2018).
34 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (2018). For examples of state laws enacting PRUCOL restrictions in their unemployment insurance laws, see the Illinois Unemployment Insurance
Act, § 614, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/614 (West 2020) (previous version at Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 444); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.085(12) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4141.29(J) (West 2020).
35 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977).
36 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1571 (2d Cir. 1985).
37 See infra Part III.
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The Western District of New York was the first court to ask what
PRUCOL meant before the case was appealed to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Holley v. Lavine.38 Gayle McQuoid Holley was a Canadian
national who entered the United States at the age of 12 in 1954 as a nonimmigrant student and practically resided in the United States ever
since.39 Ms. Holley became a resident of Monroe County, New York, and
eventually had six U.S. citizen children.40 Sometime on or before 1974,
Ms. Holley began receiving AFDC for herself and her six children
through the Monroe County Department of Social Services (“DSS”).41 In
1974, however, New York State enacted now-repealed Social Services
Law § 131-k-1, which said that every person “unlawfully residing in the
United states . . . is not eligible for aid to dependent children.”42 In an effort to comply with § 131-k-1, the Monroe County DSS stopped paying
AFDC to Ms. Holley herself, although they continued payments to her six
children, as they were U.S. citizens.43 Ms. Holley sued the Monroe Country DSS and then-Commissioner of the New York State DSS Abe Lavine
for her AFDC benefits.44 Ms. Holley argued that § 131-k-1 was
preempted by the federal “color of law” standard, and that § 131-k-1 ran
afoul of the federal Equal Protection Clause.45 The Western District of
New York found that the New York law was not in conflict with the federal “color of law” standard.46 On appeal, the Second Circuit questioned
that ruling.47 The Circuit’s decision turned on “the meaning of ‘permanently residing in the United States under color of law.’”48
The Second Circuit lamented that neither party could furnish legislative intent behind the federal statute.49 New York argued that allowing
persons like Ms. Holley to be in the United States unlawfully reflected a
problem of “horrendous proportions,” alleging financial ruin if states
were charged with supporting people like Ms. Holley financially.50 The
38

Holley, 553 F.2d at 847.
Id. at 848. She resided continuously in the United States since 1954 “except for three
months in 1958,” although the opinion does not say why she left during that time. Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Holley, 553 F.2d at 848.
44 Id.
45 Incidentally, the first time Holley v. Lavine went before the Second Circuit it produced
a much shorter opinion wherein the Second Circuit overturned the district court judge’s initial
dismissal of these federal and constitutional claims. See Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294,
1295-96 (2d Cir. 1976).
46 Holley, 553 F.2d at 848.
47 Id. at 848-49.
48 Id. at 848 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 233.50(b) (1977)).
49 Id. at 849.
50 Id.
39
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court’s response was that, although Ms. Holley did not have lawful immigration status, she was in the country “not . . . without the knowledge or
permission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.”51 The Second
Circuit reasoned that Ms. Holley was in the United States with the government’s knowledge and permission because “a responsible official” of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)—whose functions
were transferred to three new entities under the newly formed Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in 2003—had notified New York State
that “‘deportation proceedings have not been instituted . . . for humanitarian reasons’ and the ‘Service does not contemplate enforcing her departure from the United States at this time.’”52 The court described some
form of humanitarian deferred action, or special permission to defer her
deportation, which Ms. Holley had been granted because she was the parent to six U.S. citizen dependents.53
After noting that Ms. Holley was present with the government’s
knowledge and permission, the Second Circuit provided a thoughtful definition of the phrase “color of law”:
It embraces not only situations within the body of the law, but also
others enfolded by a colorable imitation. “Under color of law”
means that which an official does by virtue of power, as well as
what he does by virtue of right. The phrase encircles the law, its
shadows, and its penumbra. When an administrative agency or a
legislative body uses the phrase “under color of law” it deliberately sanctions the inclusion of cases that are, in strict terms, outside the law but are near the border.54
The court concluded that “official assurance that [a] parent will not
be deported” rendered that parent someone residing “under color of
law.”55 Reasoning that the INS had the discretion to not enforce the law
against persons it had reason to allow to remain, such an assurance was
evidence that the agency was exercising that discretion.56

51

Holley, 553 F.2d at 849.
Id.
53 Id. at 850. The opinion notes that the letter from INS actually specified that, “[s]hould
the dependency of the children change, her case would be reviewed for possible action consistent with circumstances then existing,” showing that Ms. Holley was granted deferred action at least in large part because she was caring for six U.S. citizen children.
54 Id. at 849-50.
55 Id. at 849.
56 Holley, 553 F.2d at 850.
52
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The respondents argued that the word “permanent” in “permanently
residing under color of law” meant exactly that: the status had to be conceived of as one that would last indefinitely.57 But the Holley court disagreed, invoking the doctrine of statutory interpretation known as noscitur
a sociis and divining the meaning of “permanently” by looking at other
parts of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to which the statute
in question made reference.58 From this the court concluded that “[a] relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved
eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual.”59 The court found that even though the government explicitly said
that Ms. Holley could lose her PRUCOL status if she no longer had dependents, Ms. Holley’s status was still permanent as the INA defined the
term.60 Today, as codified in federal law, the definition of “permanent”
reflects the Holley court’s interpretation.61
Ms. Holley was PRUCOL, the court held, and thus the INA
preempted New York Social Services Law § 131-k-1 such that Ms. Holley remained eligible for AFDC.62 The district court’s opinion was reversed and remanded. As a result, New York was enjoined from enforcing
§ 131-k-1 and ultimately ordered to pay Ms. Holley all overdue AFDC
back payments.63 The U.S. Supreme Court denied New York’s petition
for a writ of certiorari.64
Holley laid the ground rules of PRUCOL. First, PRUCOL status is
established when the non-citizen is in the United States with the government’s knowledge and permission, and the government does not currently
contemplate their deportation. Second, as described by the Holley court,
“color of law” encompasses those cases that are, by definition, outside the
57

Id.
Id. at 850-51.
59 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (1974)). The court noted that an extension was
“highly probable” because, given Ms. Holley’s attachments to the United States, in the court’s
opinion, “no executive department [was] likely to require her to return to a land she [had] left.”
Id. at 851.
60 Id. at 850.
61 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (2018) (“The term ‘permanent’ means a relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent
even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United
States or of the individual, in accordance with law.”).
62 Holley, 553 F.2d at 851.
63 Holley v. Lavine, 464 F. Supp. 718, 722 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). The 1979 district court
opinion also held that the state of New York was not liable for damages to Ms. Holley. Id. at
721-23. However, Ms. Holley appealed the decision on damages and the State filed a crossappeal on the other decisions against it, resulting in a final Second Circuit opinion that found
for Ms. Holley on all claims, including damages. Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d. Cir.
1979).
64 Russo v. Holley, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
58
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law. Lastly “permanently” does not mean permanent in a literal English
sense, but rather as it is used elsewhere in the INA, to wit, a relationship
that may be dissolved eventually.
Even though Holley provided a definition of PRUCOL, the definition
was nonetheless complex enough that its precise application remained
opaque. If Holley was the first time we received a definition of PRUCOL,
Berger v. Heckler was the first time we received examples of circumstances that fall into Holley’s definition.
Manny Berger was a national of the Soviet Union who overstayed a
visitor visa, surrendered to the INS in 1967, and was subsequently ordered
deported.65 The INS was unable to obtain travel documents, however, and
Mr. Berger was given an order of supervision (“OSUP”),66 a form of special permission to remain in the United States under the “supervision” of
immigration authorities.67 At some point in this process, Mr. Berger’s SSI
benefits were cut off, prompting him to sue the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) in a class action.68 Mr. Berger argued his OSUP
made him PRUCOL, and the district court case partially turned on this
issue.
In June 1978, Mr. Berger’s district court class action resulted in a
consent decree which, inter alia, said that persons with OSUPs and persons with pending visa petitions were PRUCOL.69 The initial consent decree, in fact, listed some 22 different PRUCOL categories70 but was later
amended to include 15 categories in total.71 HHS was eventually ordered
to publish a list of 15 agreed-upon categories of PRUCOL non-citizens.72
Codifying a list of PRUCOL categories was a natural way of giving clarity to a stubbornly vague definition, and the strategy of better defining
PRUCOL through a list of categories has been used by many statutes and
state public assistance administrations ever since.73 This article proposes
a taxonomy of its own in Part III.

65

Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1559 (2d. Cir. 1985).
Id.
67 See 8 C.F.R § 241.5(a) (2020).
68 Berger, 771 F.2d at 1559. Emma Mena, an SSI recipient and cancer survivor, moved
to intervene in Mr. Berger’s case after her SSI was terminated because HHS did not think that
her pending application for an immediate relative visa petition made her PRUCOL. Id.
69 Id. at 1559-60.
70 Id. at 1560.
71 Id. at 1576 n.33.
72 Id. at 1560.
73 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3 (2020); 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS.
§ 1822(g)(30)(A)(6) (1997); 130 MASS. CODE. REGS. 504.003(C) (2020); N.M. CODE R.
§ 8.106.100.7(B)(16) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 3603.2(j)(1)(ii) (2020).
66
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The consent decree parties also agreed to a definition of PRUCOL
that, though the Berger court does not explicit say so, echoes Holley:
Any other alien residing in the United States with the knowledge
and permission of the INS and whose departure from the United
States the [INS] does not contemplate enforcing is also permanently residing in the United States under color of law and may
be eligible for SSI benefits.74
The court added: “[W]e find that the phrase, ‘under color of law,’ is
designed to be an open vessel—to be given substance by experience.”75
Berger thus reaffirmed Holley’s core principal of PRUCOL, to wit, that
the phrase “encircles the law, its shadows, and its penumbra” is not meant
to be applied rigidly and should, by definition, include those who are outside the law.76
The definitions, guidance, and list-strategy laid out in Holley and
Berger have been relied upon by courts in nearly every jurisdiction where
PRUCOL has come before a court or administrative tribunal.77 After Holley and Berger, more federal district and appellate courts, as well as state
courts, have applied the PRUCOL definition to a variety of immigration
circumstances of applicants who have been denied access to Medicaid,
SSI, AFDC, and FUTA entitlement programs. In each of these instances,
courts have decided whether an applicant’s immigration circumstance,
which was neither obviously lawful nor obviously unlawful, conferred
PRUCOL eligibility for the entitlement program. All such cases are discussed infra in Part III, where they are organized by the applicant’s immigration circumstances.
D. PRWORA and the End of the PRUCOL Doctrine at the Federal
Level
By 1985, the PRUCOL category of benefit eligibility, now given a
working definition by the Second Circuit in Holley and Berger, could be
found in four different federal public benefit programs: SSI, Medicaid,
AFDC, and FUTA. This would remain the status quo until 1996.
That year, Congress passed the infamous Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which effectively

74
75
76
77

Berger, 771 F.2d at 1560 (alterations omitted).
Id. at 1574.
Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977).
See infra Part III.
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gutted many public assistance programs78 and “end[ed] welfare as we
know it.”79 Just one of the many ways it cut off millions from federal
assistance was by mostly abolishing the PRUCOL doctrine at the federal
level.80 Under PRWORA, the SSI, Medicaid, and AFDC entitlement programs would be limited to what are now termed “qualified aliens,” a much
smaller pool of non-citizens that consists only of lawful permanent residents (green card holders), asylees, refugees, some parolees, and a few
other categories that together compose a smaller number of immigrants.81
If a PRUCOL individual had been receiving SSI prior to August 22, 1996,
the date PRWORA went into effect, they could continue to receive it
thereafter.82

78 Katherine Anne Paddock Betcher, Revisiting the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act and Calling for Equality: Problematic Moral Regulations and
the Changing Legal Status of LGBT Families in a New Obama Administration, 31 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 104, 104-05 (2009).
79 Id. at 104 (quoting Chris Black, Clinton Says He’ll Sign Welfare Bill President Sees
‘Step Forward’, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1996, at A1). By changing AFDC into the TANF
program, PRWORA subjected qualifying families to greater qualification requirements, limited the availability of benefits to a maximum of five years, and required recipients to participate in work activities after receiving benefits for two years.
80 In the opinion of at least one commentator, that legislation abolished the PRUCOL
doctrine. Michael J. Sheridan, The New Affidavit of Support and Other 1996 Amendments to
Immigration and Welfare Provisions Designed to Prevent Aliens from Becoming Public
Charges, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 741, 745-51 (1998).
81 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2018). Other categories include Cuban and Haitian entrants. Id.
§ 1641(b)(7).
82 8 U.S.C § 1612(a)(2)(E) (2018); see also Forcelledo v. Colvi, No. 3:15-cv-00824-AA,
2016 WL 1718193, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 29, 2016) (“[T]he ‘permanently residing under color of
law’ standard no longer generally applies to aliens applying for SSI.”).
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However, PRWORA did not affect FUTA, and the PRUCOL doctrine appears to have lived on at the federal and state levels per that legislation.83 The federal FUTA eligibility requirement for non-citizens remains PRUCOL,84 and every state,85 the District of Columbia,86 and the
Virgin Islands87 has a statute that allows PRUCOL individuals to access
unemployment insurance under the local FUTA scheme. However, in
practice, some states seem to define PRUCOL eligibility in this context
as being “available to work,” that is, in possession of valid work authorization.88

83

See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2018); Megrabian v. Saenz, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 265 (Ct.
App. 2005).
84 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (2020).
85 ALA. CODE § 25-4-78(14)(a)(2) (2020); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.20.281(b) (2020);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-781(B) (2020); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-10-511(a) (West 2020);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 1264-1(a)(1), (3) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73107(7)(a)(III) (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-227(f)(A) (West 2020); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 3314(10)(a) (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.101(7) (West 2020); GA.
CODE ANN. § 34-8-196(d)(1) (West 2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383-29(d) (West 2020);
IDAHO ADMIN CODE r. 09.01.30.125(01) (2019); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/614(b) (West
2020); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, § 2905.1 (2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-14-9(b) (West
2020); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.5(10) (West 2020); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 871-24.60(96) (2020);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(m) (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.360(3)(a) (West
2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1600(6)(c)(I) (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1192(11)
(2019); 10-144-103 ME. CODE R. § 2.2-5 (LexisNexis 2020); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§ 8-905(a)(3) (West 2020); 151A MASS. CODE REGS. 25(h) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 421.27(k)(1) (West 2020); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.085(12)(b)(3) (West 2020); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 71-5-511(j)(i) (West 2020); MO. ANN. STAT. § 288.040(8) (West 2020); MONT. CODE
ANN.§ 39-51-2110(1) (West 2020); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-628.04(1)(c) (West 2020);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 612.448(1)(c) (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:41(I), (II)
(2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-4(i)(1) (West 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-5(A), (F) (West
2020); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 590(9) (McKinney 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-13(f)(1) (2020);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 52-06-02(14) (West 2020); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4141.29(J) (2020);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2-208(1) (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657.184 (West
2020); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802.3(a) (West 2020); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 28-44-67(a) (West 2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-67(1) (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 616-34 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-302(b)(4) (West 2020); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 207.043(a)(3) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-405(10)(a) (West 2020); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1343(f)(1) (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-617(A) (West 2020); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.098(1) (West 2020); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-6-3(8)(a) (West
2020); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(18)(a) (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-309(a) (West
2020).
86 D.C. Code Ann. § 51-109(a)(9)(A) (West 2020).
87 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 12-304(a)(7)(A) (2020).
88 See, e.g., Matter of Diamond (HUDACS), 210 A.D.2d 835, 835-36 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (noting that N.Y. Labor Law 527(1)(a) disqualifies claimants from employment insurance if they are not “available for work,” and looking to federal FUTA to define that as being
in possession of valid work authorization). See also infra Section III.A.1 for other contexts in
which PRUCOL status is limited to possession of valid work authorization.
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In the wake of PRWORA and PRUCOL’s federal demise for SSI,
Medicaid, and AFDC (TANF after 1996), states were faced with a choice
regarding citizenship eligibility for state-funded benefits. Under
PRWORA, states could end the use of PRUCOL eligibility as the federal
government had, or they could continue to provide state-funded benefits
to PRUCOL individuals. To do so, they would need to pass a new law
after PRWORA’s effective date of August 22, 1996.89 Some states did
that.90 Other states either abolished the PRUCOL doctrine or never updated their PRUCOL statutes or regulations, thereby allowing PRUCOL
in their state to become preempted by PRWORA.91
At least seven states, including New York, have retained PRUCOL
eligibility for state-funded Medicaid or Medicaid-like public health insurance schemes.92 Virginia has retained PRUCOL eligibility for its HIV
Premium Assistance program,93 and Maryland has retained the doctrine

89

8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2018).
See Megrabian v. Saenz, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 265-67 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing
California’s legislative efforts to retain PRUCOL eligibility for certain public benefits).
91 See e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3) (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 126-515(B), 126360(A), 114-1510(B)(3) (2020); S.D. ADMIN R. 67:12:01:14 (2020). New Jersey, for example,
basically stayed in lockstep with the federal law. See Guaman v. Velez, 23 A.3d 451 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (discussing the comprehensive history of New Jersey Medicaid
eligibility since PROWRA). Florida has also dropped its PRUCOL eligibility. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 443.101(7) (West 2020).
92 The states are California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and
Virginia. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14007.5(b) (West 2020); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,
§§ 50301(b)(4), 50301.6 (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-257b(a) (West 2020); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-59.4(2) (West 2020); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, §§ 118.500(a)(2),
120.310(b), 240.750 (2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, §§ 9, 16D(2), 47A (West
2020); 130 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 504.003(B)-(C), 505.004, 505.005(A)(1)-(5), 518.003(B)(C), 519.013(A) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 366(g)(1), 369-gg(8) (McKinney 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 360-3.2(j)(ii), 360-3.6(a)(2) (2020); 12
VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 30-10-170, 30-40-10 (2020).
93 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-100-260(1)(b) (2020).
90
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for its Kidney Disease Program.94 At least ten states95 and the U.S. territory of Guam96 have retained PRUCOL eligibility for means-tested, disability-based, or elderly-based cash assistance programs. Only a few states
appear to refer to PRUCOL with respect to nutrition assistance programs;
Florida has retained the PRUCOL definition to determine eligibility for
its School and Nutrition Services,97 while New Jersey,98 Maine,99 and Arkansas100 say explicitly that PRUCOL individuals are not eligible for their
state SNAP programs. Still other states have retained the doctrine for miscellaneous state benefits. One such state is Washington,101 which retained
the doctrine to determine eligibility for in-state college tuition at public
universities.
New York was the only state in which the legislature abolished the
PRUCOL doctrine for state-funded Medicaid by passing Social Services
Law § 122, but that legislative act was overturned by the New York Court
of Appeals in 2001 on state constitutional grounds, restoring PRUCOL
eligibility to New York’s Medicaid program.102 In Aliessa v. Novello, the
Court of Appeals held that Social Services Law § 122 was incompatible
with Article XVII of the New York State Constitution, which obliges the
state to provide assistance to the “needy.”103 The Aliessa court found that
it was constitutionally impermissible to condition Medicaid eligibility on
any criteria other than need, such as “alienage” restrictions.104 In effect,
the Aliessa court said that the state must provide the same benefit to
PRUCOL individuals as it does to U.S. citizen state residents.105 The

94

MD. CODE REGS. 10.30.01.09(B) (2020).
These states are Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17b112c(a), 17b-342(a) (West 2020); MD. CODE REGS. 07.03.03.07(1)(b) (2020); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 117A, § 4 (2020); 106 MASS. CODE REGS. § 703.440(A)(3) (2020); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8.106.100, 8.102.410 (2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 122(1)(c), 158(1)(g) (McKinney 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 349.3(b)(1)(iv), 370.2(c)(6)(vii), 403.7(c)
(2020); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 71P.0902(a)(2) (2020); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-6-3, 40-63.1(a), 40-6-27.1(b) (West 2020); 218 R.I. ADMIN. CODE 20-00-3.16.2 (LexisNexis 2020);
TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-01-03-.08(2)(b), 1240-01-03-.12(2)(b)(1)(ii), 1240-01-47.06(1)(b) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 74.04.805(1)(b), 74.62.030(3)(a) (2020).
96 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6) (1997).
97 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 595.408(1)(b) (West 2020).
98 N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:87–3.9(a)(2) (2020).
99 10-144-301 ME. CODE R. § FS-111-2 (LexisNexis 2020).
100 16-20-03 ARK. CODE R. § 162 (LexisNexis 2020).
101 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 28B.15.012(4)(b)(vi) (West 2020); see also the corresponding
state regulation, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-18-020(2)(b)(i) (2020).
102 Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 429 (2001).
103 Id. at 428-29.
104 Id. at 436.
105 Id.
95
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PRUCOL doctrine was thus restored to state Medicaid eligibility.106
Meanwhile, New York had actually continued to use PRUCOL eligibility
for a state-specific cash assistance program called Safety Net Assistance
(“SNA”) in part of the same 1997 law that was enacted in response to
PWRORA.107
Today, state-funded Medicaid and SNA in New York continue to
retain their PRUCOL restrictions.108 However, because no statewide consensus on the definition of PRUCOL has ever emerged, various state
agencies define the term differently. The State Department of Health
(“DOH”), which administers the state’s Medicaid program, provides a
lengthy list of immigration circumstances that it contends confer
PRUCOL eligibility, in an approach reminiscent of the Berger consent
decree’s list of PRUCOL categories.109 The state’s welfare administrative
body, the Office of Temporary Disability Assistance (“OTDA”), which
administers the SNA program, also provides a list of immigration circumstances that it sees as conferring PRUCOL eligibility, but this list is substantially shorter than the DOH’s.110 This disparity in PRUCOL definitions produces an unbalanced status quo in which many non-citizens
qualify for Medicaid but not SNA: one state agency views them as
PRUCOL, while the other does not.

106

See, e.g., Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Daines, No. 019223/09, 2010 WL 623707, at
*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2010).
107 See Tonashka v. Weinberg, 678 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
108 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 122(1)(c), 158(1)(g), 366(g) (McKinney 2020); see also
MKB v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“PRUCOL aliens, although
ineligible for many federal benefits, may nonetheless qualify in New York for state-funded
Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance.”) (internal citations omitted).
109 The New York State Department of Health has issued multiple guidance documents
and letters setting PRUCOL guidelines: ADM-7 and ADM-8, both issued in 2004, were more
generous, but INF-2 and INF-4, respectively issued in 2007 and 2008, were stricter and are
discussed in some detail in Brunswick, 2010 WL 623707, at *2. See N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
INF-4, CLARIFICATION OF PRUCOL STATUS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY (2008),
https://perma.cc/PDE4-MKR8; N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, INF-2, CLARIFICATION OF PRUCOL
STATUS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY 2-3 (2007), https://perma.cc/HQQ3-MPKQ;
N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ADM-8, ALIESSA/ADAMOLEKUN V. NOVELLO IMPLEMENTATION OF
RETROACTIVE RELIEF TO CLASS MEMBERS (2004), https://perma.cc/VKN6-T6LQ; N.Y. DEP’T
OF HEALTH, ADM-7, CITIZENSHIP AND ALIEN STATUS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MEDICAID
PROGRAM 19-20 (2004), https://perma.cc/L8CH-F6DE.
110 N.Y. OFFICE OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, LDSS-4579, NON-CITIZEN
ELIGIBILITY DESK AID 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/JZ7F-UMGB; cf. N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR HEALTH COVERAGE IN NEW YORK STATE 9-10
(2008), https://perma.cc/CTD4-AVTX. How DOH’s list and the ODTA’s list differ is addressed infra in Part III, where relevant. See also EMPIRE JUSTICE CTR., PUBLIC CHARGE AND
IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC BENEFITS 2-6 (2020), https://perma.cc/4JDF-HRTW.
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EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP ON THE PRUCOL DOCTRINE

Only a handful of scholarly articles and discussions have focused
substantially on the PRUCOL doctrine. These include Professor Sharon
Carton’s 1990 article The PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien
Eligibility for Public Benefits111 and Robert Rubin’s 1987 Walking a Gray
Line: The “Color of Law” Test Governing Noncitizen Eligibility for Public Benefits.112 While not focusing entirely on the PRUCOL doctrine, a
few other authors have provided substantial analysis of its statutory origins and judicial construction in the context of different topics.113 A few
other authors, in mentioning the doctrine, have briefly discussed the Holley decision without addressing its progeny.114 Otherwise, most references to the doctrine are cursory mentions beyond the scope of the discussions in which it is cited,115 or else the doctrine is literally a footnote.116
The doctrine also has its share of brief references in immigration and
health publications.117
111

See Sharon F. Carton, The PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien Eligibility
for Public Benefits, 14 NOVA L. REV. 1033 (1990).
112 Rubin, supra note 32.
113 Calvo, supra note 21, at 411-17; Irene Scharf, Preemption by Fiat: The Department of
Labor’s Usurpation of Power over Noncitizen Workers’ Rights to Unemployment Benefits, 56
ALB. L. REV. 561, 562-67 (1993) (discussing PRUCOL in the context of non-citizens’ unemployment insurance eligibility); Sara N. Kominers, Caught in the Gap Between Status and NoStatus: Lawful Presence Then and Now, 17 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 57, 58 (2016).
114 See, e.g., Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, California’s Proposition 187—Does It Mean What
It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 577, 598-99 (1996); Nabilah Irshad, Medical Repatriations: Death Sentencing United
States Immigrants, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 797, 802-03 (2012).
115 See, e.g., Fatma Marouf, Alienage Classifications and the Denial of Health Care to
Dreamers, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1271, 1319 (2016); Anna C. Tavis, Healthcare for All: Ensuring States Comply with the Equal Protection Rights of Legal Immigrants, 51 B.C. L. REV.
1627, 1637 (2010).
116 See, e.g., Gregory T. W. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal Protection Violations in
the Structures of State Public-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417, 1424 n.37 (2014);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law in the World
War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians – A Case Study, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 323
n.247 (1998).
117 See, e.g., Teresa L. Beck et al., Medical Care for Undocumented Immigrants: National
and International Issues, 44 PRIMARY CARE, at e1, e9 (2017); Marilyn R. Ellwood & Leighton
Ku, Welfare and Immigration Reforms: Unintended Side Effects for Medicaid, 17 HEALTH
AFF. 137, 145-46 (1998); Bill Frelick & Barbara Kohnen, Filling the Gap: Temporary Protected Status, 8 J. REFUGEE STUD. 339, 352 (1995); Charles Wheeler & Robert Leventhal, Aliens’ Rights to Public Benefits, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 913, 914, 916-17 (1986); MAYSOUN
FREIJ ET AL., N.Y. IMMIGRATION COAL., “MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY”: A STUDY OF UNINSURED
IMMIGRANTS’ PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH INSURANCE IN NEW YORK CITY 5 (2010); Marvi S.
Lacar, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996: Implications for Hispanic Migrant Farmworkers 3 (Julian Samora Research Inst., Working Paper
No. 53, 2001).
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III. APPLYING PRUCOL: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE AND TAXONOMY
Advising clients on whether or not they are PRUCOL for purposes
of accessing their eligibility for public benefits can be challenging when
their immigration status is ambiguous because the doctrine was deliberately designed to be vague and malleable. In the practice of immigration
law there are an endless variety of circumstances that either do not fit
neatly into those mentioned in a Berger-type list or otherwise raise questions about whether they fall under the Holley definition. It is precisely
such circumstances that have given rise to the available case law.
The PRUCOL categories described below are solely the authors’
designations and in no way reflect a designation articulated anywhere in
the law. The categories are invented here only to provide a convenient
index system for practitioners and a navigable taxonomy of immigration
circumstances and their corollary PRUCOL category.
One more thing to consider when reviewing the PRUCOL taxonomy
guide for practitioners: even though the federal PRUCOL doctrine was
largely abolished in 1996, several states have continued to use the doctrine to determine non-citizen eligibility for various state-funded benefits.
When they did so, courts in these states continued to rely upon pre-1996
federal case law that interpreted PRUCOL, starting with Holley and Berger, but including later federal cases discussed below as well.118 As such,
pre-PRWORA federal PRUCOL case law remains good law today in
those jurisdictions that employ a state-PRUCOL designation, and so they
are included where applicable below.
A.

Category One: Approved Applications

There are many forms of immigration relief that can be applied for
but that, if approved, do not confer “qualified alien” benefit eligibility
status.119 These include approved applications for Temporary Protected
Status (TPS), U and S non-immigrant visas, parole for less than one year,
some valid work authorizations, and certain prosecutorial discretionary
relief, such as deferred action. Generally, where individuals with such statuses have applied for and been granted some form of relief in immigration law, the courts are most likely to find that they are PRUCOL.

118 See, e.g., Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Daines, No. 019223/09, 2010 WL 623707 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2010) (relying on Holley and Berger); Tonashka v. Weinberg, 678 N.Y.S.2d
883, 884-85 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (relying on the pre-PRWORA progeny of Holley and Berger).
119 Velasquez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 581 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); see also Smart v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 921, 923 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that PRUCOL status
is not the equivalent of being lawfully admitted for permanent residence).
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Approved Employment Authorization Documents

Perhaps the most common approved application that courts regard as
conferring PRUCOL status is the approved work permit, or Employment
Authorization Document (“EAD”).120
Mr. Jose N. Vazquez, a national of Argentina, had a valid work permit, which he received because of a pending asylum application.121 Mr.
Vazquez applied for and was denied unemployment benefits based on his
alleged lack of PRUCOL eligibility during the time he had the valid work
permit, so he sued the Indiana Board of Employment.122 The reviewing
state court noted that while Mr. Vazquez lacked explicit permission to
remain in the United States, unlike the Holley claimant, courts in five
other states had relied on a valid work permit as grounds for finding someone PRUCOL.123 Finding this consensus persuasive, the Vazquez court
found Mr. Vazquez PRUCOL “until and unless this [work] authorization
is terminated by the denial of Vazquez’s petition for asylum and/or legal
proceedings of deportation.”124
In Alfred v. Florida Department of Labor, 26 Haitian nationals were
found PRUCOL during the period in which they had valid work permits.125 The court found them PRUCOL and eligible for unemployment
benefits under FUTA because the government had given no indication
that their deportation was planned or being pursued,126 even though the
state of Florida had argued that the Haitian nationals were not PRUCOL
because they had not been given an affirmative written statement that the
government did not intend to deport them. The Alfred court disagreed,
identifying their work permits as enough proof that deportation was not
currently the government’s intention.127
The Superior Court of New Jersey has also endorsed the contention,
in an unpublished opinion, that a valid work permit makes one
PRUCOL.128 The Superior Court explained that Zbigniew Cieslewicz, a
national of Poland, would have been PRUCOL during the time he worked,

120
121

E.g., Castillo v. Jackson, 566 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Vazquez v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 487 N.E.2d 171, 171-72 (Ind. Ct. App.

1985).
122
123
124
125

Id. at 172.
Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 175.
Alfred v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 487 So. 2d 355, 356-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1986).
126

Id. at 357-58.
Id. at 358.
128 Cieslewicz v. Bd. of Review, No. 161,531, 2009 WL 804400, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Mar. 30, 2009).
127
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and thus was eligible to receive unemployment benefits, if he had a valid
work permit during his period of employment.129
A number of Colorado state court decisions have also found that individuals in possession of valid work permits procured during pending
applications to adjust status were PRUCOL.130 One Colorado state court
found Mustapha Yatribi was PRUCOL for purposes of FUTA eligibility:
Mr. Yatribi had a pending application for adjustment of status, but the
court seemed to rely more on the valid work permit granted to him while
his application was pending as the primary factor conferring PRUCOL
eligibility.131
2.

Grants of Prosecutorial Discretion

Prosecutorial discretion refers to an instance in which the immigration authority “refrain[s] from asserting the full scope of the agency’s enforcement authority in a particular case.”132 The most conspicuous exercises of this discretion include stays or deferrals of deportation by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for individuals who otherwise
have no status or defense from deportation. It also includes permission to
enter the United States via the issuance of parole by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection for individuals who otherwise have no means of lawful
entry into the country.133
Post-deportation order grants of prosecutorial discretion, such as
stays of deportation, suspension of deportation, and deferred action
(which refers to the deferral of deportation) are widely recognized as conferring PRUCOL eligibility. Voluntary departure is a form of discretionary relief in which no order of deportation is issued, but the individual is
required to leave “voluntarily” by a certain date.134 The federal regulation
listing PRUCOL categories135 includes stays of deportation and voluntary

129

Id.
See, e.g., Indus. Comm’n v. Arteaga, 735 P.2d 473, 482 (Colo. 1987); Yatribi v. Indus.
Comm’n of Colo., 700 P.2d 929, 931 (Colo. App. 1985); Zanjani v. Indus. Comm’n, 703 P.2d
652, 653-54 (Colo. App. 1985).
131 Yatribi, 700 P.2d at 931 (“[P]etitioner was eligible for unemployment compensation
benefits when he received work authorization from the INS.”).
132 WADHIA, supra note 18, at 7.
133 Id. at 11.
134 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2018).
135 While the federal PRUCOL regulation is no longer in use after welfare reform and
PRWORA, we are referencing it here to provide some context.
130
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departure, both general136 and indefinite,137 as well as suspension of deportation138 and deferred action.139 California’s Medi-Cal program lists
post-deportation order grants of prosecutorial discretion, including indefinite and extended voluntary departure, as conferring PRUCOL status.140
The same goes for New Mexico’s state Medicaid regulations,141 Pennsylvania’s public assistance PRUCOL definitions (now preempted by
PRWORA),142 and the territory of Guam’s public assistance regulation.143
New York’s DOH likewise lists all of these grants of discretion among its
list of PRUCOL statuses,144 and both New York’s OTDA and DOH agree
that deferred action confers PRUCOL status.145 Massachusetts’s
PRUCOL definition lists the same,146 with the exception that instead of
listing deferred action generally, it is the only regulation that explicitly
includes Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).147 Rhode Island’s public assistance program once listed general and extended voluntary departure and stays of deportation, before it was repealed in 2018,148
while Colorado’s149 and Iowa’s150 definitions of PRUCOLfor purposes of
unemployment insurence currently list only deferred action generally as
a PRUCOL category.
Not surprisingly, the amended Berger consent decree listed stays of
deportation, suspension of deportation, deferred action, and voluntary departure among its PRUCOL categories.151 Other than Holley, in which the
plaintiff certainly had deferred action (although it was not called that by

136 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(7) (2020) (stay of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a); id. at
§ 416.1618(b)(10) (voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)).
137 Id. § 416.1618(b)(3) (indefinite stay of deportation); id. at § 416.1618(b)(4) (indefinite
voluntary departure).
138 Id. § 416.1618(b)(14).
139 Id. § 416.1618(b)(11).
140 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3(d), (e), (h), (l), (n), (q) (2020).
141 N.M. CODE R. §§ 8.106.100.7(B)(16)(a), (b)(iv), (b)(x)-(xi), (b)(xiv), (b)(xvi),
8.200.410.11 (LexisNexis 2020).
142 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(iii)-(iv), (vii), (x)-(xi), (xiv), (xvi) (2020).
143 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(vi)-(x) (1997). However, Guam’s
regulation adds voluntary departure grants of “not less than one year.” Id.
§ 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(viii).
144 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(c)-(d), (g)-(h), (k) (2020).
145 Id. § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(i); see also N.Y. OFFICE OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, supra note 110, at 1, 7.
146 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 504.003(C) (LexisNexis 2020).
147 Id. at 504.003(A)(3)(c)(6), (C)(1)-(2), (4), (7).
148 39-2 R.I. CODE R. § 0104 (LexisNexis 2020) (repealed 2018).
149 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-107(7)(a)(III)(E) (West 2020).
150 IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 871-24.60(96)(3)(b)(6) (2020).
151 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 n.33 (2d Cir. 1985).
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name),152 no other case law opines directly on whether or not these prosecutorial discretion statuses in particular are PRUCOL. The question is so
little posed probably because of the very common acceptance of their
PRUCOL eligibility in state regulations and Holley. Prosecutorial discretion is the most traditional and widely accepted form of PRUCOL status.
While an individual with a grant of parole that exceeds one year became a “qualified alien” after PRWORA,153 there is wide acceptance
among jurisdictions that parole of any shorter duration continues to confer
PRUCOL designation. The federal regulation that once provided the
PRUCOL list for purposes of SSI—published as a result of the Berger
consent decree—explicitly lists “temporary parole status” as establishing
PRUCOL status.154 Most states spell out explicitly in their state-FUTA
PRUCOL eligibility statutes or regulations that the definition of
PRUCOL includes those non-citizens “lawfully present in the United
States as a result of the application of the provisions of § 212(d)(5) of the
INA,”155 which describes parole. New York State’s Medicaid regulations
state that persons paroled into the United States for less than one year are
PRUCOL.156 California’s Medi-Cal program regulation, Rhode Island’s
former public assistance regulation, Tennessee’s cash assistance regulation, Guam’s public assistance regulation, and one Iowa social services
statute also explicitly list parolees under INA § 212 as PRUCOL.157 Similarly, many of the pre-PRWORA regulations also list conditional entrants, a form of parole, as PRUCOL,158 even though conditional entrants
became qualified aliens after PRWORA.159

152 The plaintiff in Holley was “covered by a letter from the Department of Justice stating
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ‘does not contemplate enforcing . . . [her] . . .
departure from the United States at this time,’” which was effectively a grant of deferred action. Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977).
153 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(4) (2018).
154 45 C.F.R. § 233.50(b)(4) (2020).
155 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-511(a) (West 2020); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE
§ 1264(a)(1) (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3314(10) (West 2020); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 96.5(10) (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1600(6)(c)(I) (2019); 10-144-103 ME. CODE R.
§ 2.2-5 (LexisNexis 2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 657.184 (2020).
156 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(a) (2020).
157 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3(b) (2020) (“INS Form I-94, with notation that the
alien has been paroled into the United States pursuant to INA section 212(d)(5)”); 26 GUAM
ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(iii) (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.5(10) (West 2020);
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 871-24.60(96)(3)(b)(3) (2020); 39-2 R.I. CODE R. § 0104 (repealed
2018); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-1-3-.12(2)(b)(1)(ii)(IV) (2020).
158 20
C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(1)-(2) (2020); 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS.
§ 1822(g)(30)(A)(i) (1997); N.M. CODE R. § 8.200.410.11 (2020); 39-2 R.I. CODE R. § 0104,
0104.05 (repealed 2018); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-1-3-.12(2)(b)(ii)(II) (2020); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. 28B.15.012(4)(b) (West 2020).
159 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(6)-(7) (2018).
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At least two state courts concur that conditional entrants and parolees
are PRUCOL. One Florida court has designated those granted the same
under sections 203(a)(7) and 212(d)(5) of the INA as PRUCOL.160 In a
Minnesota case, Flores v. Department of Jobs and Training, the Department of Jobs and Training conceded that Juana Flores was PRUCOL
when she had been paroled into the United States but had not been given
authorization to work.161 The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the
lower court’s decision and noted that the Department of Jobs and Training
went so far as to concede that Ms. Flores was PRUCOL, even after her
parole had expired, because INS took no steps to deport her months after
its expiration.162
3.

“Temporary” Status

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed in
1986. The Act allowed certain non-citizens present in the United States
since 1982 to apply for “temporary resident status.”163 Section 201(h)(1)
of IRCA, however, explicitly precluded recipients of temporary resident
status from being considered PRUCOL for purposes of Medicaid, food
stamps, and any other means-tested state or federal benefits.164 This was
despite the federal regulation that lists temporary resident status as a
PRUCOL category.165 Reading this regulation together with the statute
excluding means-tested benefits from PRUCOL eligibility implied that
temporary permanent residents were nonetheless eligible for unemployment insurance, which is not means-tested. Only one state court has addressed whether temporary residents are PRUCOL for FUTA purposes.
The Supreme Court of Illinois considered this question in Castillo v.
Jackson in 1992.166 Two FUTA applicants, Victorino Castillo and Alberto
Jimenez, argued that they were PRUCOL because unemployment insurance under FUTA was not Medicaid, food stamps, or otherwise meanstested, and thus an exception to IRCA’s section 201(h)(1).167 The Castillo
court appeared to agree with the appellants and proceeded to determine
whether or not they were PRUCOL.168 Relying on Holley’s definition of
160

Alfred v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 487 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1986).
161
162
163

Flores v. Dep’t of Jobs & Training, 393 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Flores v. Dep’t of Jobs & Training, 411 N.W.2d 499, 501, 504 (Minn. 1987).
Ortega de Robles v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 58 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.

1995).
164
165
166
167
168

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h)(1) (2018).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(16) (2020).
Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323 (Ill. 1992).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 329-30.
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“permanent,” the Illinois Supreme Court said that temporary residence
status was a “permanent” status despite its contrary-sounding name because the permanence of one’s status is determined “by the nature and not
simply the title of [one’s] immigration status.”169 Despite its name, temporary residence can be conferred on someone with no intention of returning to their country of origin and has no defined end to its duration.170
The Court noted that the appellants in the case had continuously resided
in the United States for years, paid taxes, held long-term jobs, and had no
principal dwelling place “anywhere but this country.”171 The Court thus
held that they were in the United States “permanently” under Holley’s
interpretation of that term.172 Again looking to Holley, the Court also
agreed that they were residing “under color of law” because their statuses
placed them in “a class of aliens covered by an INS policy or statutory
mandate not to deport.”173
A Wisconsin state court, on the other hand, dodged the question of
whether or not a beneficiary of temporary resident status under IRCA was
PRUCOL.174 Frederick N. Pickering was a national of Jamaica who was
granted temporary resident status and work authorization under IRCA.175
Before he was granted temporary residency, however, Mr. Pickering lost
his job, applied for unemployment insurance, and received it. The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations later decided that he received it improperly.176 FUTA required that an applicant be PRUCOL
during the period of work in question, and as Mr. Pickering’s alleged
PRUCOL status began after his work ended, the Wisconsin court upheld
the lower court’s decision, finding PRUCOL status could not apply retroactively.177 But the court did so without ever addressing whether or not
IRCA relief made Mr. Pickering PRUCOL.178

169

Id. at 332 (citing Castillo v. Jackson, 566 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
Id. at 331.
171 Id.
172 Castillo, 594 N.E.2d at 332.
173 Id. at 333.
174 Pickering v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 456 N.W.2d 874 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
175 Id. at 875, 877 (noting that “courts ruling that PRUCOL status was conferred by INS
action or policy have held that such status was attained when INS knew of and acquiesced to
an alien’s presence and not before” and citing to decisions from Colorado, Florida, and Indiana).
176 Id. at 875.
177 Id. at 877-78.
178 Id.
170
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Generally, temporary residence status under IRCA does not appear
on any state’s list of PRUCOL categories.179 Only Guam’s public assistance regulation lists temporary resident status holders as PRUCOL, and
then only if they are also conditional entrants, have also adjusted to lawful
permanent resident (“LPR”) status five years before applying for the benefit, or are an adult recipient of certain local benefit programs.180
TPS is another temporary form of lawful permission to remain in the
United States, usually for six- or 18-month increments, with the possibility that this permission will be renewable at the end of that period.181 The
status is country-specific and is provided to nationals of states who are so
afflicted with humanitarian disaster (e.g., the civil war in Syria, or the
2010 earthquake in Haiti) that the state department designates these nationals as excused from deportation.182 Persons with TPS are eligible to
receive work permits.183 The most significant barriers to persons with TPS
receiving recognition as PRUCOL are the federal statute and regulation
that explicitly preclude holders of TPS from PRUCOL eligibility.184 Only
one state, New York, has found a way around this federal rule.
In Karamalla v. Devine, the Supreme Court of Erie Country, New
York, recently found that TPS holders should be entitled to the same benefit as PRUCOL individuals.185 Yousif Karamalla, a national of Sudan
with TPS, applied for and was denied Safety Net Assistance, the New
York State cash benefit contingent on PRUCOL eligibility.186 Karamalla,
however, differs from the typical PRUCOL case because the court did not
determine whether or not TPS status conferred PRUCOL eligibility. Instead, the court analyzed whether or not Mr. Karamalla’s TPS entitled
him to the same benefits as PRUCOL persons on equal protection and
other state constitutional grounds. 187 The court found that he was entitled
on these grounds but without making any pronouncements about whether
or not TPS holders are themselves PRUCOL.188

179

See e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3 (2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
18, § 360-3.2 (2020).
180 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(xii) (2020).
181 8 U.S.C § 1254a (2018).
182 See, e.g., Designation of Syrian Arab Republic for Temporary Protected Status, 77 Fed.
Reg. 19026-01 (Mar. 29, 2012); Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed.
Reg. 3476-02 (Jan. 21, 2010); see also Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://perma.cc/XX5R-KQK5 (last updated Mar. 30, 2020).
183 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(B) (2018).
184 Id. § 1254a(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1619 (2020).
185 Karamalla v. Devine, Index No. 00107-2015, at 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2016), aff’d,
73 N.Y.S.3d 819 (App. Div. 2018).
186 Id. at 2.
187 See id. at 7-9.
188 Id. at 7, 8.
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Nevertheless, the court noted inconsistencies in any PRUCOL definition that would include applicants with parole, deferred action, or orders
of supervision, but not TPS—a distinction made by the state agency that
denied Mr. Karamalla public benefits.189 The court held that it was arbitrary and capricious that people with pending deportations should receive
public benefits “while Mr. Karamalla, a law abiding individual with no
deportation order, should fall outside the [safety] net. Both may be waiting for conditions in their home country to improve but only the one ordered deported or supervised gets assistance? This is not reasoning deserving of deference.”190 While not speaking directly on the PRUCOL
doctrine, the court made a helpful criticism about why a literal interpretation of the word “temporary” produces inconsistent results that seem inherently unfair. The court’s decision also speaks to the counterintuitive
nature of some PRUCOL designations discussed below.191 Following the
Karamalla decision, New York State’s OTDA issued a policy statement
indicating that it would now consider TPS holders PRUCOL.192
4.

Approved Forms I-130

To become a permanent resident through a family relation, one must
file both a “Petition for Alien Relative,” Form I-130, and an Application
to Register Permanent Residence, Form I-485. The I-130 is filed to establish a bona fide relationship between the prospective immigrant and the
sponsoring relative. The I-485 application is solely to prove that the applicant meets the requirements of permanent residency. In many cases,
the I-130 is filed first. The federal SSI PRUCOL regulation considers individuals with an approved I-130 to be PRUCOL.193 Several state statutes
and regulations, including New York’s DOH regulation, California’s
Medi-Cal program, Massachusetts’s medical assistance program, Pennsylvania’s public assistance regulation (now preempted by PRWORA),

189

Id. at 8-9.
Karamalla, Index No. 00107-2015, at 9.
191 See discussion of Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1985), infra Section
III.B.3.
192 See N.Y. OFFICE OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, GIS 16 TA/DC053,
BENEFICIARIES OF TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS (TPS) RECOGNIZED AS PERMANENTLY
RESIDING UNDER COLOR OF LAW (PRUCOL) FOR SAFETY NET ASSISTANCE (SNA) (2016),
https://perma.cc/9PKH-E9FJ.
193 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(5) (2020) (describing “[a]liens on whose behalf an immediate
relative petition has been approved and their families covered by the petition” as PRUCOL).
190
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and New Mexico’s Medicaid program also designate people with approved I-130s as such.194 Only two administrative courts have ever considered the question of whether or not such persons are PRUCOL.
New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance has at least twice
held that an approved I-130 confers PRUCOL eligibility.195 In one prePRWORA case, A.S. appealed Passaic County’s decision to remove her
from Medicaid and AFDC.196 Relying on Holley and a handful of similar
state cases discussed infra, the Division found that she was PRUCOL because the then INS had taken no steps to deport her following the approval
of her I-130.197 The Division also noted that the only reason an immigrant
visa (for LPR status) had not been issued to A.S. was because of the backlog of cases resulting from heavy demand.198 While the opinion does not
specify, these facts imply that A.S. had an approved I-130 but was not yet
able to file the I-485 application for permanent residence. This raises the
question of whether or not an individual with an approved I-130 would
still be PRUCOL if they were nonetheless ineligible to apply for a visa
for any reason, such as inadmissibility. This particular case thus leaves
open the question of whether or not an approved I-130 is always sufficient
to confer PRUCOL eligibility, or whether it must be an approved I-130
recipient who is also eligible for an immigrant visa.
In another case before New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance, C.C., an Italian national who was denied AFDC and Medicaid, likewise held an approved Form I-130.199 In that case, C.C.’s U.S. citizenspouse had filed the I-130 to petition for her.200 Following their separation
on account of domestic violence,201 C.C. filed an I-360 application to self-

194 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3(f) (2020); 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(3),
(10) (LexisNexis 2020) (describing “noncitizens who have filed an application, petition, or
request to obtain a lawfully present status that has been accepted as properly filed” as
PRUCOL); N.M. CODE R. § 8.106.100.7(B)(16)(b)(v) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2 (j)(1)(ii)(e) (2020); 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(v) (2020).
195 See C.C. v. Hudson Cty. Div. of Welfare, No. HPW 12128-95, 1996 WL 669189 (N.J.
Adm. March 27, 1996); A.S. v. Passaic Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., No. HPW 2528-95, 1995 WL
605372 (N.J. Adm. June 16, 1995).
196 A.S., 1995 WL 605372, at *1.
197 Id. at *5.
198 Id.
199 C.C., 1996 WL 669189, at *1.
200 Id.
201 The opinion does not say if the I-485 was rejected, denied or withdrawn, but implies
that one of these occurred, both because C.C. must take an alternative route to adjustment of
status and because the opinion never cites to a pending I-485 as reason to confer PRUCOL
status. Also, in the general course of USCIS practice, if an interview cannot be completed, the
adjustment application is eventually rejected or denied.
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petition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).202 The opinion did not say if the I-360 had yet been approved but noted that the I-485
had not yet been filed because C.C.’s counsel was awaiting further evidence to include in the application.203 The Division noted, however, that
the initial I-130 was approved and that “adjustment of status can be
achieved,” making C.C.’s case “even stronger than that of the plaintiff in
Holley,” who had no approved application.204
5.

Non-Immigrant Visas

Individuals with approved applications for non-immigrant visas,
whose approved applications this taxonomy might assume places them
into Category A, are generally not regarded as PRUCOL by many administrative agencies and courts. This is because non-immigrant visas are
generally not considered “permanent,” even as Holley uses the term. It
should be noted that non-immigrant visa holders are designated as lawfully present immigrants for purposes of health insurance under the ACA;
however, they are generally not considered PRUCOL for all other types
of benefits.
Generally, state statutes and regulations do not list or include nonimmigrant visas such as foreign or exchange student, or visitor visas in
their lists or definitions of PRUCOL.205 The federal PRUCOL list explicitly says “[n]one of the categories allows SSI eligibility for non-immigrants.”206
Sometimes treated differently, however, are the “special” non-immigrant visas, specifically the U, T, and S visas for victims of qualifying
crimes, victims of human trafficking, and witnesses against criminal defendants, respectively, and the K and V visas, for fiancées of USCs or
LPRs and relatives of applicants for adjustment of status, respectively.207
S, K, V, and T non-immigrant visa holders are considered PRUCOL under New York’s DOH definition.208 Another exception is Pennsylvania’s
public assistance PRUCOL list (now preempted by PROWRA), which
included “permanent nonimmigrants as established by the Compact of
202 C.C., 1996 WL 669189, at *2 (“[S]he filed for immigration benefits for herself and her
three children under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)”).
203 Id.
204 Id. at *4.
205 See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b) (2020).
206 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b) (2020).
207 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i), (S)-(V). T-visa non-immigrant visa holders, who are victims of human trafficking, are considered qualified aliens under federal law. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1641(c)(4) (2018).
208 See N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 110, at 10-11.
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Free Association Act of 1985,”209 referring to special non-immigrant visas available to nationals of certain Pacific Island nations.210 Even this is
an extremely narrow category of non-immigrants. No court has yet examined the PRUCOL eligibility of a special non-immigrant, but most of the
case law that has taken up the question of whether conventional non-immigrants are PRUCOL has concluded that they are not.
An Alabama state court, for example, found that one Dr. Joseph, a
national of Jamaica, was not PRUCOL despite his current H1-B visa.211
An H1-B visa is a non-immigrant work visa that expires on a specific
date, and the court held that the visa did not satisfy Holley’s definition of
“permanent” because it was “specifically for a nonimmigrant status with
a definite ending.”212 In Sharma v. Board of Review, a New Jersey court
likewise held that both an H1-B and a TN visa213 did not render their
holder PRUCOL.214 In that unpublished decision, the New Jersey court
said that Anil Sharma, a citizen of Canada, was ineligible for unemployment benefits because, inter alia, he was not a permanent legal resident
and not PRUCOL.215 The court gave little explanation for how it reached
this conclusion but like other courts seemed focused on the idea that the
non-immigrant visa was not “permanent” enough.216
A lower court case from Florida, Madourie v. State Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, came to a similar conclusion.217 At
issue was not whether the denied applicant for AFDC benefits, Jamaican
national Denise Madourie, was PRUCOL, but rather whether or not she
was a resident of Florida.218 Residency of Florida was another requirement of AFDC eligibility in the state at the time, separate from PRUCOL
status, but the court found that the Jamaican national was not a resident
because she held only a non-immigrant B2 visitor visa (colloquially
known as a tourist visa).219 The court pointed to the purpose of the nonimmigrant visa, which is explicitly for those who do not intend to stay

209

55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(xvi) (2020).
Kevin Morris, Navigating the Compact of Free Association: Three Decades of Supervised Self-Governance, 41 U. Haw. L. Rev. 384, 402 (2019).
211 Joseph v. State, 600 So. 2d 298, 301 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
212 Id.
213 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(a) (2020). A TN visa is a special visa for temporary professionals who
are Canadian or Mexican nationals.
214 Sharma v. Bd. of Review, A-0607-11T2, 2013 WL 1222672, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2013).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Madourie v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 667 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (finding that plaintiff’s B-2 visa “renders her statement of residency questionable”).
218 Id.
219 Id.
210
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permanently in the United States.220 Despite numerous renewals of her B2
visa, the court held that the nature of the visa meant that Ms. Madourie
did not intend to immigrate permanently into the country and therefore
could not be considered a Florida resident.221 The case, while not speaking
directly on the PRUCOL doctrine, nonetheless reinforces the idea that
non-immigrant visas fail to satisfy the permanency requirement of
PRUCOL. Other state courts have reached similar conclusions about the
non-permanency of non-immigrant visas, albeit outside the context of the
PRUCOL doctrine.222
Only a couple of cases have differed in their conclusions. In 1993, a
North Carolina state court found that those holding valid Seasonal Agricultural Worker (“SAW”) non-immigrant visas were “lawfully present”223 and, so it follows a fortiori, PRUCOL. David R. Hopkins was a
tobacco farmer who employed, among others, persons with SAW nonimmigrant visas.224 Mr. Hopkins, who was required by North Carolina
law to pay unemployment taxes on his employees, argued that he should
not have to pay those taxes on SAW employees because they were themselves not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.225 The Court of
Appeals of North Carolina found that the SAW employees were lawfully
present and thus eligible for unemployment insurance benefits in the
state.226 However, one who is lawfully present is also PRUCOL,227 and
thus the decision provides authority for the proposition that SAW nonimmigrant visa holders are PRUCOL.
In M.R. v. Passaic County Board of Social Services, a decision by
New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance, a national of Zambia who
220

Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 239.
222 See Pinilla v. Bd. of Review in Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 382 A.2d 921, 923 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1978) (finding that a non-immigrant B2 visitor visa holder was in the United
States temporarily and unauthorized to work in the country, and thus not eligible for unemployment benefits during the time she worked); Jimoh v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 902
A.2d 608, 611 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (declining to rule on the question of whether the F-1
visa holder Tajudeen A. Jimoh was PRUCOL for purposes of state unemployment insurance
eligibility because the issue was not preserved on appeal).
223 State ex rel. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n of N.C. v. Hopkins, 432 S.E.2d 703, 705 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993).
224 Id. at 703-04.
225 Id. at 704.
226 Id. at 705.
227 See Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 334 (Ill. 1992) (“If it is conceded that Castillo
and Jimenez were ‘lawfully present for the purposes of performing services’ from the date of
IRCA’s passage, it makes no sense to say that Castillo and Jimenez were not also ‘under color
of law’ as of such date. We find this to be the case because . . . the ‘under color of law’ prong
of PRUCOL is a less restrictive requirement than the ‘lawfully present’ requirement . . . of
FUTA.”).
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held a J-1 non-immigrant student visa228 successfully argued that she was
PRUCOL.229 The Zambian national had applied for a waiver of the J-1
visa’s two-year foreign residence requirement on the basis of hardship,
arguing that her husband had a medical condition that could not be treated
in Zambia and that deportation would result in his death.230 After filing
her waiver application, M.K. had applied for AFDC benefits but was denied by the County Board of Social Services on the basis that she was not
PRUCOL.231 Relying on a number of decisions, including Holley,232 the
Division concluded that “federal law rejects any attempt to deny a benefit
where the INS has issued official documents” and that M.K. was
PRUCOL because she “has applied for waiver to the residency requirement and that application is now pending.”233 It seems appropriate to categorize M.K.’s case with non-immigrant visas instead of pending applications because the application that was pending here was for an
extension of a non-immigrant visa, implying that the non-immigrant visa
itself conferred PRUCOL status. So far, no court appears to have considered other non-immigrant visas, such as F-1 visas, for example.234
B.

Category Two: Pending Applications

The federal PRUCOL regulation definition lists pending applications
for adjustment of status as another circumstance that confers PRUCOL
eligibility.235 California, New York, and New Mexico also list pending
applications for adjustment of status. Massachusetts adds pending applications for asylum, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and
any other “application, petition, or request to obtain a lawfully present

228

J-1 visas permit exchange students to enter the United States temporarily. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(J) (2018).
229 M.K. v. Passaic Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., No. HPW 2276-95, 1995 WL 508073, at *1
(N.J. Adm. June 2, 1995).
230 Id. at *2.
231 Id.
232 Id. at *3-4.
233 Id. at *5.
234 The authors’ research for this article did not uncover any court decisions in which other
non-immigrant visas were considered. See e.g., Jimoh v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 902
A.2d 608, 610-11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (declining on procedural grounds to address J-1
visa holder’s argument that his status made him PRUCOL for purposes of state unemployment
benefit eligibility).
235 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(6) (2020) (where USCIS categorizes these applications as
“properly filed”).
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status” to its list.236 New York’s DOH also includes pending applications
for asylum, cancellation of removal, and suspension of deportation.237
Multiple federal and state court decisions have found that PRUCOL
eligibility is conferred upon a person where they have an outstanding application for relief that has not yet received an answer from immigration
authorities.
1.

Pending Applications for Prosecutorial Discretion

One federal opinion discussing the PRUCOL doctrine in detail is
Farjam v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration.238 Decided by
a court in the Eastern District of New York a year before PRWORA made
PRUCOL individuals ineligible for SSI, at issue was whether or not a 75year-old national of Iran, Akhtar Farjam, was PRUCOL for SSI purposes.239 Ms. Farjam had submitted applications for “voluntary departure
or deferred action” status, but she had not yet received a reply from the
former INS (whose particular functions in this case are now carried out
by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services [“USCIS”] under
DHS).240 The court relied upon the knowledge-plus-permission standard
set out in Holley and elaborated in Berger.241 The court went on to clarify
that the phrase “does not contemplate enforcing” does not mean official
determination or authorization of the same, but rather includes non-citizens whose residence in the United States continues by virtue of “acquiescence.”242 Therefore, to be consistent with Berger, PRUCOL includes:
scenarios in which INS does not respond to requests . . . yet in
which official acquiescence to an individual’s presence is nevertheless present. Such a situation would be present when INS is
made aware on numerous occasions of the presence of an illegal
alien yet does not take action to enforce the departure.243
The INS had been aware of Ms. Farjam’s presence since she requested voluntary departure of deferred action status but took no steps to
deport her, and therefore, despite the fact that no response had yet been
received, the court held that Ms. Farjam was PRUCOL.244
236

130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(8), (9), (10) (2020).
See N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 110, at 10.
238 Farjam v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-94-4486 (CPS), 1995 WL 500477
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995).
239 Id. at *1-2.
240 Id. at *1.
241 Id. at *3-4.
242 Id. at *4 (quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 (2d Cir. 1985)).
243 Farjam, 1995 WL 500477, at *4 (citation omitted).
244 Id. at *5.
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Similar facts were before the Supreme Court of New York, Nassau
County, in Brunswick Hospital Center, Inc. v. Daines.245 Clare Thompson, an undocumented national of Jamaica, suffered a stroke and was admitted to Brunswick Hospital and then a nursing home.246 Brunswick
Hospital filed an application on Ms. Thompson’s behalf with USCIS for
voluntary departure in order to make her PRUCOL and thereby eligible
for non-emergency Medicaid.247 That application for voluntary departure
went unanswered for seven years and remained unanswered at the time of
the court’s decision.248 When Brunswick Hospital applied for Medicaid
for Ms. Thompson, they were denied by Nassau County DSS and DOH,
which argued that Ms. Thompson’s outstanding application for voluntary
departure did not make her PRUCOL.249 The Brunswick Hospital Center
sued the New York State DOH, and the court decided that Ms. Thompson
was indeed PRUCOL.250
The court found that the authorities had knowledge of Ms. Thompson’s presence because USCIS had “canceled” her passport and because
that agency had received her application for voluntary departure.251 The
court further found acquiescence from USCIS’s failure to try and deport
Ms. Thompson for seven years since receiving her application, adding
that there was no requirement that Ms. Thompson follow up with USCIS
on the status of her request for voluntary departure in order for her to
maintain her PRUCOL status.252 The court ordered the state agency to
restore her Medicaid coverage immediately.253 Notably, the court cited
Holley and other state decisions on PRUCOL status for the proposition
that the “terms and requirements defining PRUCOL should be broadly
interpreted.”254
Finally, recall that in M.K. v. Passaic County Board of Social Services, New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance found M.K., a noncitizen with a pending application for a waiver of the termination of her
J-1 non-immigrant visa permit, was PRUCOL for purposes of AFDC eligibility because “federal law rejects any attempt to deny [a] benefit where
the INS has issued official documents” and because M.K. had “applied
245

Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Daines, No. 019223/09, 2010 WL 623707 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 22, 2010).
246 Id. at *1.
247 Id. at *2.
248 Id. at *1-2. Ms. Thompson’s application for voluntary departure was submitted in April
2002.
249 Id. at *1.
250 Brunswick Hosp. Ctr, 2010 WL 623707, at *6.
251 Id. at *4.
252 Id. at *4, *6.
253 Id. at *7.
254 Id. at *5.
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for waiver to the residency requirement and that application [was] now
pending.”255
2.

Pending Applications for Adjustment of Status to Lawful
Permanent Residence

Five states currently list or formerly listed a pending application for
permanent residency (i.e., an application to become a green card holder)
as a PRUCOL category,256 and a number of state courts have concurred
with this interpretation.
In one of the first New York state cases to consider the PRUCOL
doctrine, the First Department considered in 1979 whether a deceased
Greek national was posthumously PRUCOL during the period of her life
in which she had a pending application for permanent residence.257 Ms.
Papadopoulos had suffered a stroke for which she received care and, following her death, her daughter sued New York State’s DSS on her behalf
for Medicaid coverage that had been denied during her period of care.258
The court relied on Holley and found that Ms. Papadapolous’s pending
green card application made her PRUCOL because the INS regulation
forbade her deportation while her application was pending.259
In a scenario similar to the one in Brunswick Hospital Center, the
South Nassau Communities Hospital brought suit in St. Francis Hospital
v. D’Elia against Nassau County’s DSS on behalf of one of its patients,
Concepcion Dominquez, a national of Spain, after she was denied Medicaid coverage for her care.260 Ms. Dominquez had a pending application
for an “immigrant visa,” and, quoting Papadopoulos and Holley, the court
found that this made her PRUCOL.261 Specifically, the court reasoned:
Mrs. Dominquez’ entry into this country on a valid non-immigrant visa, her timely application for an immigrant visa, the correspondence with her by the consular service of the Department
of State at her residence in the United States after the expiration
date of her non-immigrant visa, and the failure of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service to deport her, all impel the conclusion

255 M.K. v. Passaic Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., No. HPW 2276-95, 1995 WL 508073, at *5
(N.J. Adm. June 2, 1995).
256 These states are California, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania (before
PRWORA), and New Mexico.
257 Papadopoulos v. Shang, 414 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153-54 (App. Div. 1979).
258 Id.
259 Id. at 154-55.
260 St. Francis Hosp. v. D’Elia, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104, 108-09 (App. Div. 1979).
261 Id. at 109-10.
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that at the time of her admission to the hospital Mrs. Dominquez
was residing in this country under color of law.262
The facts do not clarify whether an application for an “immigrant
visa” refers to a pending I-130 or I-485, or both, but that term properly
refers here to an I-485.263 New York’s Second Department would draw
the same conclusion in a similar case years later.264
The Court of Appeals of Oregon followed Papadopoulos, St. Francis
Hospital, and Holley in Rubio v. Employment Division, when it found that
Mexican national Ascencion Rubio was PRUCOL during the time in
which he had a pending application to adjust his status through his U.S.
citizen spouse.265 While his application was pending, Mr. Rubio was also
granted permission to exit and re-enter the United States, and this permission was extended repeatedly.266 The court noted that Mr. Rubio “was
married to a United States citizen, working for a United States business
and had begun the necessary steps to achieve a legal permanent residence,” and reasoned from this that INS knew of his residence “by its
routine regular extensions of his voluntary departure,” and therefore “had
acquiesced in it.”267
The first Illinois state court to consider the PRUCOL doctrine likewise found that a non-citizen Medicaid applicant was PRUCOL on the
basis of a pending application for permanent residence.268 Interestingly,
however, that court questioned whether the receipt notice for an I-130 was
sufficient proof that the applicant had a pending application for permanent
residence.269 The court found that it was not sufficient evidence of such,
relying on the Medicaid and Medicare Guide,270 an instructional guidebook produced by HHS, which was in use until 1996 and which required
a form I-94 or an I-210 as proof of a pending application for permanent

262

Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
Id. Form I-130 is a prima facie determination that one has a relationship qualifying
them for an immigrant visa. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, https://perma.cc/8KMC-29K4 (last updated Aug. 4, 2020).
The I-485 is the application for the immigrant visa itself. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(3)(ii); U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or
Adjust Status, https://perma.cc/6M3B-7S3P (last updated Aug. 12, 2020).
264 See Mary Immaculate Hosp. Div. of Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc. v.
Krauskopf, 475 N.Y.S.2d 132, 132-33 (App. Div. 1984).
265 Rubio v. Emp’t Div., 674 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
266 Id. at 1202.
267 Id. at 1203.
268 Bennetto v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 550 N.E.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
269 Id. at 1045.
270 Id. at 1044-45.
263
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residence.271 Courts do not often raise the issue of what constitutes proof
of a pending application.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that
pending “alien relative petitions” or other applications for legal permanent resident status confer PRUCOL eligibility.272 In Industrial Commission of State v. Arteaga, the Court came to this conclusion regarding the
plaintiffs’ PRUCOL eligibility for FUTA benefits where the plaintiffs
held valid work authorization and pending applications for adjustment of
status.273 Perhaps most notable is Sandoval v. Colorado Division of Employment: it is the only Colorado case in which the court said explicitly
that a pending application for legal permanent residence is sufficient to
confer PRUCOL status for purposes of FUTA eligibility, even when the
applicant does not also have a valid work permit.274 Martin Sandoval, who
was brought to the United States as a child without inspection, was placed
into deportation proceedings, whereupon he applied for non-LPR cancellation of removal and then later applied to adjust his status through a U.S.
citizen spouse.275 Following Arteaga and Holley, the court held that each
of those applications in and of themselves were sufficient to confer
PRUCOL eligibility upon Mr. Sandoval.276
In Yatribi v. Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado, an individual with a pending “alien relative” petition to adjust status was held
to be PRUCOL.277 The court found Mustapha Yatribi was PRUCOL for
purposes of FUTA eligibility, not only because of his pending application
to adjust status, but also because of a valid work permit granted while his

271

Id.
See, e.g., Indus. Comm’n of State v. Arteaga, 735 P.2d 473, 481-82 (Colo. 1987).
273 See id. Arteaga was not disturbed by the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Esparza v. Valdez
one year later. Rather, the question of PRUCOL designation was rendered moot before the
Circuit for unrelated reasons. Esparza v. Valdez, 862 F.2d 788, 792-93 (10th Cir. 1988).
274 Sandoval v. Colo. Div. of Emp’t, 757 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Colo. App. 1988) (“Although
the Panel found that claimant . . .did not have a valid INS work authorization during his base
period, claimant’s lack of such an authorization is merely one factor to consider in determining
whether he met the requirements of ‘permanently residing in the United States under color of
law.’ . . . Because the other evidence so overwhelmingly establishes claimant’s ‘permanent
resident under color of law’ status, we hold that here the lack of a work authorization permit
is not determinative.”) (citations omitted).
275 Id. at 1106 (“[C]laimant challenged [his attempted removal] pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254 based on seven years continuous presence in the U.S., good moral character, and extreme hardship to the applicant or legally present family members.”).
276 Id. at 1108 (“Here, claimant had pending at all times during his base period at least one
petition which would result in the adjustment of his status to lawful permanent resident.”).
277 Yatribi v. Indus. Comm’n of Colo., 700 P.2d 929, 930 (Colo. App. 1985).
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application was pending.278 The court held the same in a later case, Zanjani v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, finding that Bahman Zanjani
was PRUCOL because he also had a pending adjustment of status application and a valid work permit.279 The court noted that “[p]etitioner was
also here under color of law because the INS made no effort to deport him
during the application process,”280 and “petitioner became eligible for unemployment benefits when the INS demonstrated its intention to allow
petitioner to remain in the country until he obtained permanent resident
alien status.”281
In only one case, In re Fodor, has a court appeared to say that an
individual with a pending application for adjustment of status is not
PRUCOL. This minority view came from a federal bankruptcy court in
Florida. Zsolt Fodor, a Hungarian national, had a pending application for
permanent resident status but was denied the benefit of Florida’s homestead exemption, which allows debtors to be exempt from the claims of
creditors on the debtor’s home.282 The exemption is available to debtors
with a residence in the state and with the actual intent to live in the state
permanently, which Florida courts have interpreted to mean that the
debtor has to be a citizen or a legal permanent resident.283
Mr. Fodor was a debtor who owed two other individuals $44,480.54
and argued that he should be protected from their claim for that sum
against his home under the homestead exemption because he was
PRUCOL and therefore, he reasoned, a permanent resident of the state.284
The court disagreed, distinguishing Mr. Fodor’s pending application for
lawful permanent residence from individuals with pending asylum applications. The court averred that, unlike individuals with a pending asylum
application, Mr. Fodor’s “residential status” was “temporary” because he
“merely held an Employment Authorization card.” 285 The court seemed
unaware that an asylum applicant could hold the same and concluded that
because he was “temporary,” Mr. Fodor could not establish the intent to
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Id. at 931 (“[P]etitioner was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits when
he received work authorization from the INS.”).
279 Zanjani v. Indus. Comm’n of Colo., 703 P.2d 652, 654 (Colo. App. 1985).
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 In re Fodor, 339 B.R. 519, 520-21 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006). “There shall be exempt
from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a
lien thereon . . . the following property owned by a natural person: (1) a homestead.” FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
283 Id. at 521-22.
284 Id. at 520.
285 Id. at 523.
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make his home a “permanent homestead” as the homestead provision required.286 Without explicitly saying Mr. Fodor was not PRUCOL, in distinguishing his case the way that it did, the court implied that his pending
application did not satisfy the “permanent” element of the PRUCOL doctrine, at least not in the way someone with a pending asylum application
would.287
3.

Pending Applications for Asylum

After PRWORA in 1996, asylees and refugees, as well as grantees
of “withholding of removal” (a form of refugee-like relief) became “qualified aliens” for purposes of federal benefit eligibility, making them eligible for most federal entitlements.288 Prior to PRWORA, however,
asylees, refugees, and grantees of withholding of removal were generally
considered PRUCOL,289 and many states’ regulations listed them this
way.290 But now that persons granted asylum are “qualified aliens,” the
question that remains is whether or not PRUCOL eligibility is conferred
upon non-citizens with a pending application for asylum.
While only Massachusetts regulations explicitly list asylum applicants as PRUCOL,291 case law from five states agrees with that assessment. For example, the Supreme Court of Rockland County in New York
found that a national of Bulgaria with a pending asylum application and
a work permit was PRUCOL.292 New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance likewise found that non-citizens with pending asylum applica-
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Id.
Id.
288 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2), (3), (5) (2018).
289 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(8)-(10) (2020); Unemployment Compensation Program
Letter No. 1-86, 51 Fed. Reg. 29713-01 (Aug. 20, 1986) (stating that parolees and refugees
would be treated as PRUCOL); see also Getahun v. Office of Chief Admin. Hearing Officer,
124 F.3d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff was authorized to work because her
grant of asylum, by statute, provided her with permanent residing status, notwithstanding that
her employment authorization documents had yet to be received).
290 See, e.g., 26 GUAM ADMIN R. & REGS. § 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(i)-(ii), (v)-(vi) (1997); ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, § 2905.15(a)(3) (2019); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 871-24.60(96)(3)(a)(1)(2), (b)(6) (2020); N.M. CODE R. § 8.200.410.11(B)(2)(b)-(c), (f) (2020); 55 PA. CODE
§ 150.1(b)(3)(viii), (ix), (xv) (2020); 39-2 R.I. CODE R. § 0104 (repealed 2018); UTAH ADMIN.
CODE rs. 994-405-1002, 994-405-1005 (2020); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.15.012(4)(b)
(West 2020).
291 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(8) (LexisNexis 2020).
292 Tonashka v. Weinberg, 678 N.Y.S.2d 883, 886 (Sup. Ct. 1998). The court followed
Holley and the reasoning of the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Divisions in the first
and second departments with respect to pending green card applications discussed above. Id.
at 885-96.
287

2020]

PRUCOL

403

tions and valid work authorizations were PRUCOL, noting that either factor conferred PRUCOL status on them.293 And a majority of the Supreme
Court of Colorado found a group of Polish nationals with pending asylum
applications and valid work authorizations were PRUCOL for purposes
of FUTA eligibility,294 although the court appeared to rely heavily on the
applicants’ valid work authorization and eligibility for prosecutorial discretion (to wit, voluntary departure) in rendering its decision.295
In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. v. Solis, the
Supreme Court of Florida also considered whether an applicant with a
pending asylum case was PRUCOL, this time for purposes of AFDC and
Medicaid, and found that they were.296 Luisa Solis and her five children
were Nicaraguan nationals who feared persecution in that country, and
thus applied for political asylum.297 Uniquely, the court cited the testimony of an INS employee who testified that an individual with a pending
asylum application is not deported unless they are “an absolute threat to
public safety” and that their case could be pending for as long as 30
years.298 Florida’s Supreme Court regarded this as proof that the INS had
knowledge of Louisa Solis’s presence in the United States but was acquiescing to her presence, and concluded that she was therefore PRUCOL,
looking to Holley.299 The Court followed Holley’s definition of “permanent” and regarded Ms. Solis’s presence as “permanent” because there
was no defined end point to her time in the country.300
A lower Florida state court in Lisboa v. Dade County Property Appraiser re-affirmed Solis in 1998 when, citing to Solis, it concluded that
another asylum seeker was PRUCOL, this time for purposes of Florida’s
homestead tax exemption.301 The Court said that Mr. Lisboa, like Ms.
Solis, “ha[d] a ‘permanent’ status,” and “[t]he fact that his status can be
‘dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the
individual’ does not detract from its permanency.”302 This, too, echoes
Holley’s interpretation of “permanent.”

293 S.D. v. Passaic Cty. Welfare Agency, No. HPW 2524-95, 1995 WL 508076, at *3 (N.J.
Admin. Jun. 5, 1995).
294 Div. of Emp’t & Training v. Turynski, 735 P.2d 469, 472 (Colo. 1987).
295 See id. at 472.
296 Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Solis, 580 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1991).
297 Id. at 147.
298 Id. at 149.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 149-50.
301 Lisboa v. Dade Cty. Prop. Appraiser, 705 So. 2d 704, 707-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
302 Id. at 707 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (2018)); see also DeQuervain v. Desguin,
927 So. 2d 232, 235-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (reaffirming that asylum applicants satisfy
the homestead tax’s permanent-residency requirement).
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Perhaps what is most notable about Solis is that it is the only decision
in which a court appears to say that asylee derivatives listed on a pending
asylum application are as PRUCOL as the applicant herself. Ms. Solis had
five children, who presumably were listed on her application. The court
appeared to infer that the government knew about her children as much
as it knew about her when it concluded, “[W]e agree with the district court
that Solis and her family fit within the PRUCOL language.”303 Generally,
when an asylum applicant wins their claim, their non-citizen children or
spouse living in the United States and listed on their application are automatically granted status as derivative asylees.304 In this respect, the derivative asylee has a pending application for status as much as the principal
asylum applicant. The Solis court appeared to recognize this and regarded
the whole family as PRUCOL for this reason.
One question that may arise when considering the PRUCOL designation of a pending asylum claim is whether the asylum applicant’s
PRUCOL eligibility persists if their application is denied by USCIS but
then referred to the immigration court in the context of a deportation proceeding. In Gillar v. Employment Division, the Supreme Court of Oregon
answered that question in the affirmative.305 Bohuslav J. Gillar, a national
of then-Czechoslovakia, was initially denied asylum by INS and opted to
renew his request before an immigration court.306 Today, a denial by
USCIS would result in the applicant’s case being referred to the immigration court for deportation proceedings, where the application for asylum
would be reviewed de novo.307 At issue was whether or not Mr. Gillar was
PRUCOL for purposes of the state unemployment insurance.308 The court
relied on Holley and a number of other cases to reason that, because the
law said that Mr. Gillar could not be deported until a determination on his
case was made, he was residing under color of law until that time.309 The
Gillar court further said that he was permanently residing in the United
States because, while he was awaiting the determination, his time in the
country had “no defined end or defined purpose.”310 The court’s last point
echoes the reasoning of the Solis court.
One federal appellate court came to a different conclusion about
pending asylum applications. In 1985, it was the Ninth Circuit’s turn to
303 Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Solis, 580 So. 2d 146 at 150 (Fla. 1991) (emphasis
added).
304 See e.g., Mobombo v. Holder, 403 Fed. App’x 873, 874 (4th Cir. 2010).
305 Gillar v. Emp’t Div., 717 P.2d 131, 137 (Or. 1986).
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 134.
309 Id. at 137.
310 Id. at 138.
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consider whether a pending asylum application conferred PRUCOL status: in Sudomir v. McMahon, three asylum seekers applied for AFDC benefits but were denied because they were asylum applicants.311 The asylum
seekers brought a class action against the state of California and sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent California from denying AFDC to asylum seekers.312 The district court denied the injunction, and the asylum
seekers appealed to the Ninth Circuit.313 The question before the Ninth
Circuit was whether or not asylum seekers were permanently residing under the color of law.314
While the plaintiffs invoked Holley’s knowledge and permission
standard and the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the word “permanently,”315 the court did not rely on that decision or the one in Berger.316
Instead, the court went against precedent and said that “[i]t stretches this
language considerably to have [the word ‘permanently’] embrace” asylum applicants,317 and it sided with the state government’s more limited
definition of what PRUCOL and “permanently” meant.318 The court
agreed that the applicants were in the country under the color of law but
said their statuses were not permanent, but inchoate.319 In the court’s
view, “permanently” connoted a situation in which the person’s status
could theoretically continue indefinitely, as was the case in Holley, not
where the applicant’s status merely “[gave] rise to the possibility” of indefinite residence, which it saw as temporary.320 The court also described
temporary grants of work authorization as similarly inchoate.321 Finding
this a permissible construction of the statute, the court found for the state
of California, upholding the denial of AFDC benefits.322
Interestingly, the Sudomir court did note that, even by its narrower
definition of PRUCOL, persons with indefinite stays of deportation or extensions of voluntary departure were PRUCOL because they had been
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Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). Elizabeth Sudomir sought
asylum from Poland, while Ebrahim Nejati and Mahin Vojdani sought asylum from Iran. Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 1459.
315 Id. at 1460-61.
316 Sudomir does not follow Berger but merely states in a footnote that the Berger consent
decree did not include pending asylum applications, ignoring the actual reasoning the Berger
court applied in its opinion, to wit, that there is a need to interpret the PRUCOL doctrine
broadly. See Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1460 n.6.
317 Id. at 1459.
318 Id. at 1461-62.
319 Id. at 1461.
320 Id. at 1462.
321 Id. at 1464.
322 Id.
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“subject to official review” and were “entitled to reside in the United
States for an indefinite period.”323 The court also noted that temporary
parolees were PRUCOL because the statute explicitly made them so, but
did not reflect at all on the ostensible contradiction between its own “permanent” vs. “inchoate” definition and the statute’s explicit grant of
PRUCOL status to temporary parolees.324 Instead, the court explained the
inconsistency by noting that temporary parolees were given permission to
enter the country and remain, while asylum applicants entered or remained in the United States “illegally,”325 an inaccurate assessment.326
The court explained this as consistent with Congress’s intent to “end the
ad hoc use of parole authority, which had been implemented by custom
rather than clearly defined by law.”327 Furthermore, the court pointed to
the INS practice of forcing some persons who present claims for asylum
at the border to wait outside the United States for a determination on their
application, and said that defining asylum applicants as PRUCOL “would
seriously undermine this new scheme,”328 referring presumably to both
the practice of having some asylum applicants wait outside the country
and disdain for “ad hoc” forms of relief.
The dissent by Judge William C. Canby did follow Holley’s definition of “permanently.” Judge Canby, too, looked to the statutory definition of “permanently”329:
[A] relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished
from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though
it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of
the United States or of the individual, in accordance with the
law.330

323

Id. at 1459-60. Note that the court also dismissed the asylum seekers’ argument that
the PRUCOL requirement violated the federal Equal Protection Clause, finding rational basis
review was appropriate and upholding the district court’s finding that there was a rational
reason for the distinction. Id. at 1466.
324 Id. at 1462.
325 Id. at 1459, 1462.
326 The assessment that asylum applicants were in the country “illegally” is inaccurate
since they are permitted to enter after a preliminary determination is made that they have a
reasonable fear of persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (describing one’s entry into the United
States for the purpose of seeking asylum as a lawful process).
327 Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1463 (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 5 (1970)) (alterations omitted).
328 Id. at 1462-63.
329 Id. at 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting).
330 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (2018).
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Judge Canby noted that “temporary,” as it is defined in the statute, is
used to describe non-immigrant visa holders, such as students and tourists, persons for whom “there is never any intention of abandoning the
country of origin as home,”331 a distinction from “permanently” that
would certainly mean that asylum applicants are PRUCOL inasmuch as
they have every intention of abandoning their country of origin. They are
not temporary, Judge Canby argued, simply because “their continued
presence is solely dependent upon the possibility of having their applications for asylum acted upon favorably,” as the majority insisted.332 On the
contrary, Judge Canby found this description of asylum seekers more
analogous to temporary parolees and conditional entrants, who might also
have their continuous presence revoked at any time but are nonetheless
PRUCOL,333 and to persons with indefinite stays of deportation or grants
of voluntary departure, who also remain in the country only until the immigration authorities revoke their permission and who are also
PRUCOL.334 Finally, Judge Canby argued that the Refugee Act cannot be
interpreted as relegating asylum seekers to non-PRUCOL status, especially because Judge Canby could not “ascribe to Congress, in passing the
Refugee Act for clearly humanitarian purposes,” an intent to deny asylum
seekers “the means to feed, clothe and house their families” while remaining in the United States or “an intent to require victims of persecution to
run that kind of gauntlet.”335
Sudomir may be the most controversial case in PRUCOL history.
The jurisdictions discussed above have not followed it and some courts
have explicitly rejected it.336 Still other courts have tried to narrow its
precedent by applying it only to facts like those before the Sudomir court.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has said that Sudomir does not apply to
an asylum applicant seeking unemployment benefits under FUTA, or its
state counterpart, nor to asylum applicants with work authorization, nor
to applicants for asylum who are “covered by a policy of extended voluntary departure,” that is, likely to receive some form of prosecutorial discretion even in the absence of their asylum application.337
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Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1468 (quoting id. at 1462).
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 See, e.g., Castillo v. Jackson, 566 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he narrow
view of the Sudomir court should be rejected.”); Gillar v. Emp’t Div., 717 P.2d 131, 140 (Or.
1986) (“We too reject the Sudomir proposition that asylum applicants can never be ‘permanently residing’ in this country and are therefore automatically ineligible for a variety of benefits.”).
337 Div. of Emp’t & Training v. Turynski, 735 P.2d 469, 472 (Colo. 1987).
332
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Sudomir may be an outlier—but it has followers. The first California
state court to consider the PRUCOL doctrine338 was the Second District
Court of Appeal of California, in Zurmati v. McMahon. At issue was
whether or not Golgotai Zurmati, a national of Afghanistan, was
PRUCOL for purposes of AFDC benefits where she had a pending asylum application.339 The state court found that she was not PRUCOL despite her having valid work authorization and the standard asylum receipt
notice that said she was permitted to remain in the United States at least
until her case was decided.340 The court followed Sudomir and held that
Ms. Zurmati’s status was not “permanent.”341 The court limited the
PRUCOL doctrine to those who were residing in the United States as the
result of a “affirmative admission or grant of status.”342
Zurmati was followed by its sister court, the First District Court of
Appeal, in Khasminskaya v. Lum.343 Tsilia Khasminskaya, a Ukrainian
national, was also an asylum applicant who applied for and was denied
state-funded general cash assistance.344 Nevertheless, following Sudomir
and Zurmati, the Lum court held that Ms. Khaminskaya was not lawfully
present (and thus, not PRUCOL) because “her residence was not yet established as lawful on a permanent basis.”345
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, Sudomir was followed on at least two
other occasions, possibly three. The most significant of these was Joudah
v. Ohio Department of Human Services, in which an Ohio court of appeals
upheld a lower court’s heavy reliance upon Sudomir to find that an asylum
applicant with valid work authorization was not PRUCOL.346 The appellate court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in following
Sudomir and determining that Mahdi Joudah, a national of Kuwait, did
not satisfy the “permanent” element of PRUCOL.347
Sudomir was again followed in a brief decision issued by the New
Jersey Employment Compensation Board, which, in its failure to mention
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Zurmati v. McMahon, 225 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (Ct. App. 2d 1986) (“There are no reported decisions of the California courts on the issue presented.”).
339 Id. at 375-76.
340 Id. at 379-80.
341 Id. at 380-82.
342 Id. However, the court also distinguished the facts before it from those in Holley and
attempted to make the holding in that case logically consistent with its own by saying that the
Holley petitioner was given explicit permission to remain until her children were adults. Id. at
381-82.
343 Khasminskaya v. Lum, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915 (Ct. App. 1st 1996).
344 Id. at 916.
345 Id. at 919-20.
346 Joudah v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 641 N.E.2d 288, 290-91 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
The lower court was the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County. Id. at 289.
347 Id. at 290-91. But see Vespremi v. Giles, 427 N.E.2d 30, 31-32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
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Holley or any other contrary decisions available at the time, clearly
cherry-picked case law to avoid compliance with stare decisis.348 That
tribunal, too, found that an asylum applicant was not PRUCOL, this time
for purposes of qualifying for unemployment benefits.349
Finally, a decision from New York State’s Fourth Department, Bibezic v. Schauseil, held that an asylum applicant was not PRUCOL.350 While
this decision was then mentioned by the Supreme Court of Rockland
County in Tonashka v. Weinberg,351 the Bibezic opinion itself is not published and is otherwise unavailable, so it remains unknown whether or not
the Fourth Department followed Sudomir or simply came to the same conclusion on its own reasoning.
All told, courts in four states (California, Ohio, New Jersey, and New
York) have followed the Sudomir decision, while courts in six jurisdictions (Oregon, Florida, Colorado, Massachusetts, New York, and New
Jersey) have rejected Sudomir. Notably, New Jersey and New York remain in turmoil on the issue, with lower or administrative court decisions
coming down on both sides and New York’s DOH and OTDA departments coming to different conclusions as well—the former lists asylum
applicants as PRUCOL, while the latter does not. Nonetheless, it remains
the case that more jurisdictions have rejected Sudomir than have followed
it.
4.

Pending Applications for Other Immigration Relief

Only Massachusetts and New York PRUCOL regulations state that
applications for relief generally confer PRUCOL status.352 Unlike asylum
applications, however, there is virtually no case law on pending applications for other forms of relief other than prosecutorial discretion, adjustment of status, and asylum. No court has spoken squarely, for example,
on whether or not PRUCOL status is conferred upon an applicant for TPS,
a Special Immigrant Juvenile visa, or a U or T non-immigrant visa.
Only one court has opined, albeit indirectly, on the PRUCOL nature
of an application for relief other than prosecutorial discretion, adjustment
348

In re J.C., No. UCC 90026-91, 1991 WL 441657, at *1 (N.J. Adm. Sept. 23, 1991).
Id. at *2.
350 Tonashka v. Weinberg, 678 N.Y.S.2d 883, 885 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (discussing Bibezic v.
Schauseil, 236 A.D.2d 899 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)).
351 Id. (“[I]n Matter of Bibezic, the Fourth Department recently upheld denial of benefits
to a person with an asylum application pending, relying on the fact that the Desk Aid of the
Department of Social Services’ Public Assistance Source Book, which contains a list of persons considered to be PRUCOL, did not include a person awaiting a determination on an asylum application.”).
352 See 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii) (2020).
349
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of status, or asylum. In Brambila v. Board of Review, New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, a superior court of New Jersey found that
Carolina and Mario Brambilla were not PRUCOL for purposes of FUTA
eligibility, even after having filed applications for temporary resident status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and during
the period of time in which they were in possession of special agricultural
worker status and work permits based on their pending IRCA application.353 However, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed that decision.354 The Court’s reversal was effectively on other grounds, finding
that the Brambilas were entitled to FUTA because they were “lawfully
present,” an entirely different eligibility category beyond the scope of this
article, and so it did not reach the PRUCOL question.355 Despite never
reaching the PRUCOL question, anyone who is lawfully present is also
PRUCOL, as at least one court has noted.356 Brambila thus ultimately
provides persuasive authority for the proposition that applications for
other forms of relief, such as temporary residence under IRCA, also confer PRUCOL eligibility.
C. Category Three: Explicit Knowledge and Permission Without an
Application or Grant
Category three comes up less frequently in the case law than any
other, owing to the rare circumstance in which the government issues explicit written declarations of permission to remain in the United States
without also granting the individual some form of categorical relief. Because these are not official statuses, they cannot be applied for or granted.
Examples from this category demonstrate that a non-citizen need not have
a grant of, or a pending application for, immigration relief, such as TPS
or deferred action, to be considered PRUCOL. Rather, mere written permission, absent any official category of relief, is sufficient to demonstrate
that they are here permanently with the immigration authorities’
knowledge and permission.
353 Brambila v. Bd. of Review, N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 574 A.2d 992, 994-95 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), rev’d, 591 A.2d 605 (N.J. 1991); Brambila, 591 A.2d at 608 (“Because INS had not yet granted the claimants temporary-resident status, the Board denied benefits”).
354 Brambila, 591 A.2d at 613.
355 Id. at 609 (“We need not address the third category (PRUCOL) . . . . We focus instead
on the ‘lawfully-present’ exception.”).
356 See Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 334 (Ill. 1992) (“If it is conceded that Castillo
and Jimenez were ‘lawfully present for the purposes of performing services’ from the date of
IRCA’s passage, it makes no sense to say that Castillo and Jimenez were not also ‘under color
of law’ as of such date. We find this to be the case because . . . the ‘under color of law’ prong
of PRUCOL is a less restrictive requirement than the ‘lawfully present’ requirement . . . of
FUTA.”).
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Orders of Supervision

Perhaps the most common version of explicit permission is the order
of supervision. An order of supervision cannot be applied for but is merely
a form of conditional prosecutorial discretion.357 The federal definition of
PRUCOL358—and almost every state definition available—identifies orders of supervisions as conferring PRUCOL eligibility.359 Berger, in addition to resulting in a consent decree that gave the first PRUCOL category list, also established that non-citizens with orders of supervision are
PRUCOL.360 While an order of supervision is typically provided to anyone who first receives a grant of deferred action or a stay of deportation,
it can be said to fall into the category of explicit knowledge and permission without an application or grant insofar as it is not a grant that one can
apply for. Rather, the order is literally a written record that the government conditionally promises to delay deportation at least until the date
provided in the order.361
2.

Other Explicit Permission to Remain

The first PRUCOL case, Holley, gave not just the definition of
PRUCOL but also the very first example of what this third category of
PRUCOL designation looks like. Holley did not say that Gayle McQuoid
Holley was ever granted a specific category of immigration relief, such as
deferred action—although, that is likely how we would classify her relief
today.362 Instead, the opinion explained that she was in possession of a
letter from INS that explained in explicit terms that she was not in deportation proceedings for humanitarian reasons, and that this would remain
the case until such day as those reasons changed.363 While today we would
characterize such written permission as a grant of deferred action, the option of applying for deferred action as one would apply for other forms of
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8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h) (2020).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(12) (2020).
359 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301.3(c) (2020); 26 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS.
§ 1822(g)(30)(A)(6)(v) (1997); 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(5) (2020); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(b) (2020); 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(xii) (2020).
Both of New York’s definitions agree on the same. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(b) (2020); see N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 110, at 9; N.Y. OFFICE
OF TEMP. & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, supra note 110, at 7.
360 Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1559-60 (2d Cir. 1985).
361 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b), (h) (2020).
362 Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977).
363 Id. at 849-50. The opinion notes that the letter from INS actually specified that
“[s]hould the dependency of the children change, [Holley’s] case would be reviewed for possible action consistent with circumstances then existing,” showing that she was tacitly granted
deferred action at least in large part because she was caring for six U.S. citizen children.
358
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categorical immigration relief was relatively new and little-known in the
1970s.364 Instead, Ms. Holley’s PRUCOL designation was based solely
on the bureaucratic equivalent of a doctor’s note.
From the Ninth Circuit came another case with similar facts to Holley. Flores v. Bowen raised the interesting question of whether or not Julio
Flores, a national of Mexico, was PRUCOL based on his possession of
what was known as a Silva letter.365 In the 1977 case Silva v. Levi, an
Illinois district court issued an injunction and ordered INS to issue a letter
to approximately 250,000 non-citizens who had applied for permanent
residence,366 explicitly granting them permission to remain and work in
the United States.367 These became known as Silva letters, and in 1977
Julio Flores acquired one after having applied for permanent residence in
1976 and being denied. Mr. Flores then became disabled and applied for
SSI benefits.368 By this time the Social Security Administration (SSA)
regulations had designated Silva letter-holders PRUCOL, and Mr. Flores
was granted SSI.369 But in 1982, the Silva court dissolved the injunction,
and SSA followed suit by declaring that Silva letter-holders were no
longer PRUCOL—without changing its regulations.370 Mr. Flores’s SSI
benefits were cut off, and he sued the SSA.371 In its decision, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the end of the injunction was not followed by any revocation of the Silva letters. The higher court stated that the Illinois district
court had held that the letters remained valid and their holders remained
PRUCOL until such time as their letters were affirmatively revoked.372
The Ninth Circuit also noted that SSA had not actually changed its regulation, only its internal policy, and that this too was a reason Mr. Flores
remained PRUCOL.373 Interestingly, Rhode Island’s PRUCOL definition

364 The first known case of a non-citizen filing an application for deferred action occurred
in 1972, when John Lennon, through counsel, requested on humanitarian grounds that he be
granted deferred action and allowed to remain in the United States while he and his wife Yoko
Ono concluded a custody battle over her daughter from a previous marriage. See WADHIA,
supra note 18, at 4, 16-18.
365 Flores v. Bowen, 790 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1986).
366 See Silva v. Levi, No. 76-C4268 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1977), modified on other grounds
sub nom; Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979). Silva enjoined the INS from deporting
certain nationals with appropriate priority dates for the issuance of an immigrant visa because
the INS had previously allocated certain visas erroneously. See Bagues-Valles v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1985).
367 Flores, 790 F.2d at 741 (citing Silva, No. 76-C4268).
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Flores, 790 F.2d at 741-42.
373 Id. at 742.
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is the only one that listed Silva letters on its list of those circumstances
which confer PRUCOL status.374
Also from Rhode Island is another case involving explicit permission
to remain, Lapre v. Department of Employment Security, in which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed the question of whether or not
something called “deferred inspection” conferred PRUCOL eligibility.375
Upon returning from her native Germany, Helga Lapre, a permanent resident of the United States, learned after she reentered the United States
that the length of her stay in Germany was long enough that she was considered to have abandoned her permanent residence and was now out of
status.376 Ms. Lapre was eligible to reapply for permanent resident status,
so she was issued “deferred inspection” status at the border upon her entry.377 Deferred inspection is not actually a status at all, but merely a temporary pass issued by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) when “an
immediate decision concerning the immigration status of an arriving traveler cannot be made at the port of entry due to a lack of documentation.”378
It is unclear from the court’s opinion whether or not this pass was given
to Ms. Lapre in writing or issued to her verbally, but the current CBP
policy is to provide a deferred inspection grantee with “an Order to Appear-Deferred Inspection, Form I-546, explaining what information
and/or documentation is required to resolve the discrepancy.”379
Ms. Lapre then continued to stay in the United States for about eight
months with her deferred inspection before she applied again for permanent residence.380 The question was whether or not Ms. Lapre was
PRUCOL for purposes of FUTA eligibility during the period of time she
had deferred inspection.381 The court relied on Holley and its progeny to
determine that Ms. Lapre was indeed PRUCOL because she was in the
United States with INS’s knowledge and acquiescence.382 The court inferred knowledge and acquiescence because INS told Ms. Lapre she was
eligible to adjust her status and took no steps to deport her, also noting
that the INS Operating Instruction at the time instructed that anyone prima
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39-2 R.I. CODE R. § 0104.05 (LexisNexis 2020) (repealed 2018).
Lapre v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 513 A.2d 10 (R.I. 1986).
376 Id. at 11.
377 Id.
378 Deferred
Inspection Sites, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
https://perma.cc/Q6K7-U5BG (last visited May 21, 2020).
379 Id.
380 Lapre, 513 A.2d at 11.
381 Id.
382 Id. at 12-13.
375
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facie entitled to adjustment of status should not have deportation proceedings initiated against them.383 Ms. Lapre’s deferred inspection permission
was not unlike the letter in Holley, in that explicit permission from both
the “deferred inspection” and from the INS Operating Instruction was
given to her to remain without granting her any status and without her
having any pending application for status.
Another way to consider cases like Holley and Lapre: PRUCOL status is conferred upon a person anytime the government has a policy
against deportation for people in that person’s specific situation. However, that has been the case historically only when that policy is in writing
or when it is inferred from the government’s habit of action or inaction.
D. Category Four: Implicit Knowledge and Permission Inferred from
Circumstances
In this category of PRUCOL eligibility, no application has necessarily been filed or granted, and there is no explicit policy to cite or written
permission in the non-citizen’s possession. Instead, a court or agency infers that a person is in the United States permanently with the government’s knowledge and permission merely from the circumstances surrounding the person’s case. Knowledge and permission or acquiescence
are deemed implicit.
The original federal definition of PRUCOL and most state definitions include a catch-all PRUCOL category that seems to contemplate this
or a similar scenario.384 New Mexico’s catch-all category, for example,
includes “any other aliens living in the United States with the knowledge
and permission of the immigration and naturalization service and whose
departure the agency does not contemplate enforcing.”385 These catch-all
categories appear to contemplate circumstances where individuals have
neither an approved status, nor a pending application for the same, nor
any explicit permission to remain permanently. Thus, they appear to anticipate circumstances in which permission to remain must be inferred
from circumstance.
Several courts have inferred from the circumstances surrounding an
individual’s case that they are PRUCOL despite lacking granted or pending applications or explicit permission of any kind.

383

Id.
20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(17); see, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301(b)(3) (2020);
130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(11) (2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 3603.2(j)(1)(ii)(l) (2020); 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(xvi) (2020).
385 N.M. CODE R. § 8.106.100.7(B)(16)(b)(xvi) (LexisNexis 2020).
384
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Deportation Proceedings

One category of non-citizens whose PRUCOL designation remains
a relatively open question are those who have been placed into deportation (“removal”) proceedings but have not yet been deported. While two
different courts have looked at these circumstances, neither have given
clear guidance.
A very short concurring opinion in Alfred v. Florida Department of
State Labor seems to state that someone in deportation proceedings is
PRUCOL, at least until they are afforded their individual or merits hearing.386 In Alfred, the majority opinion identified 26 Haitian nationals as
PRUCOL because they either had valid work permits or were parolees or
conditional entrants.387 A very short concurring opinion noted: “It is admitted that [the PRUCOL Haitian nationals] cannot be excluded or deported without a prior hearing.”388 The concurring judge reasoned then,
that “[s]ince they have not yet been granted the required hearing, it inevitably follows that they are residing in the United States ‘under color of
the law,’ which grants them that right.”389 Under this interpretation, until
an individual is placed into deportation proceedings and is scheduled for
or participates in a hearing, they remain PRUCOL.
Two decisions from the Supreme Court of Utah have also attempted
to clarify the significance of deportation proceedings for a person’s
PRUCOL eligibility. In Antillon v. Department of Employment Security,
Baltazar Antillon, a national of Mexico, had received a grant of voluntary
departure and a docket number with a date by which he was supposed to
leave the United States.390 Mr. Antillon never left, overstayed his departure date, and instead filed an application for suspension of deportation.391
In response, INS served him a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) before an immigration judge with the date of the hearing “to be determined,” but the
government never scheduled a hearing.392 Based on this, the court reasoned that Mr. Antillon was PRUCOL because the docket number and
NTA showed INS knew he was in the United States. The agency’s failure
to schedule or hold a pre-trial hearing, called a “master calendar” hearing,
proved their acquiescence to his presence.393 The highest court of Utah

386 Alfred v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 487 So. 2d 355, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring).
387 Id. at 356-57 (majority opinion).
388 Id. at 359 (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring).
389 Id. (alterations omitted).
390 Antillon v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 688 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 1984).
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 458-59.
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thus appeared to say that being in deportation proceedings but not scheduled for a hearing makes one PRUCOL. Interestingly, the court did frame
Mr. Antillon’s PRUCOL status as one based on his pending application
for suspension of deportation. The court could have relied on the application as a source of Mr. Antillon’s PRUCOL eligibility but did not.
However, the Supreme Court of Utah may have retreated somewhat
from the Antillon pronouncement in a later decision. In Alvarado v. Board
of Review of Industrial Commission of Utah, Hismael Alvarado, also a
Mexican national, applied for unemployment benefits under FUTA.394
Following Mr. Alvarado’s application for a docket control permit or, in
the alternative, a suspension of deportation, INS issued an NTA and
scheduled what seemed from the opinion like a master calendar hearing,
though no date had yet been set for a trial (called an “individual hearing”)
to adjudicate Mr. Alvarado’s application.395 Mr. Alvarado argued that he
was PRUCOL until such time as the individual hearing took place.396 The
Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, finding that on these facts INS “continued to make all proper and concerted efforts to enforce the law and
deport Alvarado” because “an initial hearing was held” on his case.397
Both courts focused on the deportation proceedings as the source of
PRUCOL eligibility. One material difference between Mr. Alvarado’s
and Mr. Antillon’s circumstances was that the former was scheduled for
a master calendar hearing but latter was not, rendering the latter PRUCOL
but not the former. During Mr. Alvarado’s final immigration hearing, the
judge determined that he was, in fact, deportable, which was not a conclusion drawn in Mr. Antillon’s case.398 The court also differentiated the
two men’s cases by reasoning that Mr. Antillon had voluntarily initiated
contact that led to proceedings, in which INS took no further action and
deemed that he was PRUCOL.399 Mr. Alvarado, on the other hand, was
arrested during a sweep operation and did not—either himself or by an
attorney—present himself to immigration.400 Read together, these cases
imply that whether or not an individual in deportation proceedings is
PRUCOL depends on how they ended up in proceedings and what stage
of the proceedings they reach.
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Alvarado v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 737 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
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Id.
Alvarado, 737 P.2d at 182.
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Immigration Internment

No case law has commented on whether or not immigration “detention” confers PRUCOL eligibility, but an unusual case from the U.S. Federal Court of Claims, Shibayama v. United States, provides an interesting
argument for why immigration detention could confer PRUCOL eligibility. In 1988, Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act (“CLA”) to
“acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and
internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry during World War II.”401 The CLA created a trust fund and
directed the Attorney General to pay each “eligible individual” reparations of $20,000 for their unjust internment during World War II.402 Isamu
Shibayama, Kenichi Shibayama, and Takeshi Shibayama were three
brothers who were nationals of Peru but of Japanese ancestry and who
were abducted with their parents and sisters by American military forces
on March 1, 1944.403 For reasons that are unclear in the opinion, they were
forcibly brought to the United States from Peru and held at an internment
camp in Crystal City, Texas.404 During their internment, they were not
legal permanent residents or citizens of the United States.405
The Shibayama brothers applied for their $20,000 under the CLA,
arguing that they were entitled to it because, even though they were not
legal permanent residents or U.S. citizens during their internment, they
were nonetheless PRUCOL.406 Relying on Holley and Berger to make
their point, the Shibayama brothers argued that they were in the country
with the government’s knowledge and permission by virtue of being forcibly held in a government-operated internment camp inside the United
States.407 The Federal Court of Claims did not comment on whether the
Shibayama brothers were PRUCOL during their internment, and instead
denied their claim because PRUCOL status is not equivalent to permanent
resident status, and the CLA limited entitlement to persons who were permanent residents and citizens during internment.408
Whether or not the Shibayama brothers were PRUCOL remains an
open question. In fact, eight years prior to Shibayama, attorney Manjusha
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Shibayama v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 720, 721 (2002).
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
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Id. at 743.
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Id. at 744.
Id. at 744-45.
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P. Kulkarni made the same argument as the Shibayama brothers, describing it as “the most feasible alternative”409 to an equal protection argument
for future Japanese-Peruvian plaintiffs seeking redress for their internment.410
The analogy between the internment of Japanese nationals and the
many thousands of non-citizens who are interned in immigration prisons
and concentration camps today is a natural one. Like the Shibayama
brothers in 1944, immigration “detainees” of today are held in the U.S.
government’s custody against their will. Government custody shows the
government’s knowledge of these non-citizens’ presence and permission
to remain in the United States, at least until their deportation is effectuated, or as Kulkarni argued for Japanese-Peruvian internees: “INS knew
and permitted Japanese Peruvians to reside in the United States without
formal documentation, and did not contemplate enforcing their deportation.”411 In this way, Kulkarni and the Shibayama brothers supply an argument for why immigration “detainees” may be PRUCOL.
3.

Immigration Authority Inaction Alone

Some courts have found that PRUCOL status can be conferred
simply by the immigration authority’s failure to place someone in deportation proceedings despite knowing that the individual is in the United
States.412 For example, suppose an application for relief is denied or an
individual’s relief expires, but the individual is never placed into deportation proceedings. They have no explicit permission to remain and no
application for relief. However, some courts have said that if the government has some knowledge that the person is here but responds to their
presence with inaction, this allows us to infer PRUCOL eligibility.
In S.W. v. Paterson City Welfare Division at Passaic Welfare
Agency, the New Jersey Human Services and Economic Assistance Board
held that S.W. was PRUCOL when he applied for cash assistance.413 He
applied for permanent residence status and was subsequently denied, but
was not subject to deportation for years.414 Relying on Holley, but also
Antillon and Cruz, as discussed below,415 the tribunal reasoned that “even
409 Manjusha P. Kulkarni, Application of the Civil Liberties Act to Japanese Peruvians:
Seeking Redress for Deportation and Internment Conducted by the United States Government
During World War II, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 309, 338 (1996).
410 Id. at 332-33.
411 Id. at 338.
412 See Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 333 (Ill. 1992).
413 S.W. v. Paterson City Mun. Welfare Div. at Passaic Cty. Welfare Agency, No. HPW
07398-04, 2005 WL 183093, at *3 (N.J. Adm. Jan. 13, 2005).
414 Id.
415 Id. at *2.
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without letters and documentation from INS, there is persuasive case law
that holds that an alien is PRUCOL, where the INS knew of his presence
but took no action to deport him.”416 It concluded that S.W. was PRUCOL
since “the INS knew of S.W.’s status because they received and reviewed,
but did not accept, his application for permanent residency and did not
commence deportation proceeding [sic].”417
L.R. v. Passaic County Board of Social Services, issued by Human
Services and Economic Assistance of New Jersey, held that L.R., a Cuban
national with Cuban entrant status, was PRUCOL from 1980 to 1996
simply by virtue of receiving a stamped I-94 upon entry into the United
States in 1980, and was thus eligible for the assistance she received during
that time.418 The tribunal relied on Antillon, summing up its holding
thusly: PRUCOL status is conferred “where the INS knew of [the person’s] presence but took no action to deport [them].”419 The court implies
that L.R.’s I-94 proved the government knew she was here and acquiesced
to her presence for the 27 years it failed to deport her.420
S.W. and L.R. open the door to the possibility that even rejected or
denied applications, as long as they are not followed by a referral to an
immigration court, still confer PRUCOL status on the applicant.
Possibly the most radical of the cases involving implicit knowledge
or inferred permission came out of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. In 1985, the Court faced the question of whether Luisa Cruz was
PRUCOL for purposes of federal Medicaid eligibility.421 Ms. Cruz had
entered the United States with her mother when she was a child.422 She
and her mother entered on non-immigrant visitor visas, which Ms. Cruz
then overstayed, though her mother eventually became a legal permanent
resident after marrying a U.S. citizen.423 At some point Ms. Cruz filed an
application for adjustment of status herself, but then became terminally
ill and entered a semi-comatose state, and her family “did not pursue the
adjustment of status proceedings.”424 The Court noted in a footnote that it
was unclear whether the application was “completed but never filed” or
whether it was “filed and then proceedings were suspended.”425

416

Id. at *3.
Id.
418 L.R. v. Passaic Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., No. HPW 07124-07, 2007 WL 2852197, at *1,
*3-4 (N.J. Adm. Aug. 30, 2007).
419 Id. at *4.
420 Id.
421 Cruz v. Comm’r of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262, 1263-64 (Mass. 1985).
422 Id. at 1263. The Court’s opinion does not say how old she was at the time of entry.
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 Id. at 1263 n.2.
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What does seem clear from the opinion is that the Court did not care
if the application was never filed, or filed and suspended. Instead, the
Court found that, if the facts before it were confirmed, Ms. Cruz was
PRUCOL.426 The Court relied on Velasquez and Antillon to note that in
those cases, the circumstances were enough to find knowledge and acquiescence, pursuant to Holley.427 The Massachusetts court found that for
Ms. Cruz as well, the agency’s inaction “warrants the inference that the
INS has acquiesced in the plaintiff’s continued presence in the country.”428
What makes Cruz such an unconventional decision is the basis upon
which the Court found knowledge and acquiesce. The Court observed that
Ms. Cruz had lived in the United States for more than 12 years, that her
parents were an LPR and a citizen, and that the record suggested that INS
was aware of her presence and that it could have proceeded to deport her
but had decided not to do so.429 The Court said nothing about the adjustment of status application and indeed was unclear on whether or not the
application had even been submitted. Presumably, the Court inferred that
the INS had knowledge of Ms. Cruz’s presence from either her entry visa
or her mother’s immigration application history, or both, but it did not
specify. Either way, the Court found that these facts “may fall squarely
within the rationale of Holley,” despite the fact that Ms. Cruz lacked any
official written permission to remain as the Holley plaintiff had.430 The
Cruz court thus indicated that someone might be PRUCOL under Holley’s
rationale whenever circumstances indicate that (1) the government has at
some point received word that they are residing in the country and (2) the
government has taken no steps to deport them. This may be the broadest
ever interpretation of Holley. Such a PRUCOL designation would widen
the doctrine to include a very large number of otherwise undocumented
residents of the United States, including anyone who had ever overstayed
a non-immigrant visa but was never placed into deportationproceedings.
The only consideration narrowing the Court’s holding slightly is that it
seemed to matter that Ms. Cruz appeared to be eligible for suspension of
deportation due to her serious illness.431
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Id. at 1266-67.
Id. at 1265-66 (noting that in Velasquez “the judge reasoned that evidence of the
agency’s history of inaction was sufficient to establish . . . that the INS had acquiesced in her
presence within the country,” and in Antillon, the plaintiff was PRUCOL “when the INS was
aware of his presence and knew where to find him, but it had taken no action to deport him”).
428 Id. at 1266.
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 Id. Professor Irene Scharf provides the most detailed discussion of the Cruz decision to
date in her 1993 article. Scharf, supra note 113, at 569-70.
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The Western District Court of Washington may have similarly extended the boundaries of PRUCOL in Mayorquin v. Secretary of HHS.
Guillermo Mayorquin was a citizen of Mexico who entered the United
States without inspection and then suffered diabetes and kidney failure
such that he required dialysis.432 He applied for SSI benefits based on
these impairments but was ultimately denied by HHS on the basis that he
was not PRUCOL.433 The Western District observed that Mr. Mayorquin’s situation was not reflected anywhere in the list of PRUCOL examples provided in the federal PRUCOL definition, but that Mr. Mayorquin
was nonetheless PRUCOL under the catch-all provision of that regulation.434
The court was vague on the facts but observed that Mr. Mayorquin’s
presence in the United States and his fragile medical condition had “been
presented to the I.N.S. repeatedly by advocates for [the] plaintiff, entreating the I.N.S. to make a decision.”435 Although the opinion did not say
whether this meant that any application had been filed or was pending
before INS,436 there was some indication that this may have been an application for indefinite voluntary departure.437 The opinion added that no
action had been taken to enforce Mr. Mayorquin’s departure and that INS
could “furnish no indication of when, if ever, it will even consider plaintiff’s case.”438 The only specifics the opinion gave were that “a letter from
the district director of INS demonstrates that the agency had made no determination as to plaintiff, and provided no timetable for when it would
do so, if ever.”439 Notably, the holding of the case turned on the absence
of a decision by the agency:
[Mr. Mayorquin] is not required to show that I.N.S. has determined he is entitled to stay. He need only show that the agency is
presently permitting him to reside in the United States indefinitely, and does not contemplate enforcing his departure. This record establishes that the I.N.S. refuses to contemplate plaintiff at
all; and thus by default is permitting him to remain in the United
States indefinitely.440
432

Mayorquin v. Sec’y of HHS, No. C88-1032C, 1989 WL 225598, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 21, 1989).
433 Id. at *2.
434 Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(17) (2020).
435 Mayorquin, 1989 WL 225598, at *3.
436 Id.
437 Id. at *1 (“It is therefore highly likely that, once INS begins an investigation into his
status, he will be granted an indefinite voluntary departure.”).
438 Id. at *3.
439 Id. (citation omitted).
440 Id. (citation omitted).
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The Western District was not as concerned with what the letter
showed in terms of action, but what the lack of enforcement showed “by
default.”441 The court seemed to imply that it is permissible to look at
what the government is not doing (enforcement) rather than what they
have affirmatively done (letter of permission) in considering PRUCOL
eligibility. Despite the government’s knowledge that Mr. Mayorquin was
present, they took no steps to deport him—by their inaction, the government showed they were permitting him to stay.442
As a final example, recall that in Flores v. Department of Jobs and
Training, discussed supra, the Supreme Court of Minnesota approved applications conferring PRUCOL eligibility. In that case, Minnesota’s Department of Jobs and Training conceded that Ms. Flores was PRUCOL
even after her parole had expired because INS took no steps to deport her
months after its expiration.443 Here, too, the court upheld an administrative decision that seemed to say that PRUCOL status is conferred, even
after a status expires, for as long as the government fails to deport, or try
to deport.
4.

Cuban Nationality Per Se

This category of cases ceased to be legally relevant at the end of the
Obama presidency, when it was announced that the United States would
resume deportations of deportable Cuban nationals to Cuba.444 This has
remained the case under the Trump regime.445 Prior to this announcement,
owing to the unique political relationship between the United States and
Cuba (or lack thereof), nationals of Cuba were long treated differently
under American immigration law.446 Also making Cuban nationals unique
was Cuba’s refusal to accept deported Cuban nationals from the United
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Id.
This rationale might be similar to the Eastern District’s in Farjam but for the fact that
in Mayorquin there was no pending application for relief, or at least the court’s reasoning
would not have changed even without one. Farjam v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-944486 (CPS), 1995 WL 500477, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995).
443 Flores v. Dep’t of Jobs & Training, 411 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 1987).
444 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: CHANGES TO PAROLE AND EXPEDITED
REMOVAL POLICIES AFFECTING CUBAN NATIONALS (2017), https://perma.cc/B6NG-2Z9V.
445 Adriana Gomez Licon & Gisela Salomon, Trump Administration Ramps Up Deportations
to
Cuba,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Oct.
11,
2019),
https://apnews.com/5a885a04f8bc4ad99144bf7e01be39a6. Please note: The authors are choosing to
use the term “Trump regime” rather than “Trump administration” because they contend it
more accurately reflects this president’s unprecedented and authoritarian treatment of law and
policy, and out of concern that using “administration” normalizes the same.
446 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d 1418, 1419-20 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing
special rights and privileges under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act).
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States.447 In practice, for many years, that meant that the federal government did not deport Cubans.448 While it may no longer be helpful for Cuban nationals today, the following caselaw may be helpful by way of analogy for nationals of other countries that may in the future develop similar
diplomatic relationships with the United States.
In S.N. v. Hudson County Division of Social Services, a decision from
New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance, S.N. was a Cuban national who entered the U.S. on a B-2 visitor non-immigrant visa and was
issued an I-94 upon entry.449 S.N. overstayed her B-2 visa, accrued unlawful presence, then applied in 1997 for permanent residence status.
Subsequently, she applied for and received a work permit that same
year.450 Her application for permanent residence was approved in 1999
under the Cuban adjustment law, but at issue was her state benefit eligibility prior to her LPR status.451 The Division found that S.N.’s circumstances conferred PRUCOL status on her as early as August 22, 1996,
when the state benefit she was applying for became available to PRUCOL
individuals.452 The Division noted that, both in 1996, before she had applied for permanent residence or been granted a work permit, and after
she had been out of status for several years, S.N. was PRUCOL.453 She
had resided permanently since her entry and gave the government every
indication that she did not intend to return to Cuba because she “routinely
told the INS where she was.”454 The INS was aware that she was in the
United States during this time but, inferable from their failure to deport
S.N., did not intend to deport her.455 Thus, despite being out of status
without any pending application for status in 1996, the Division inferred
from S.N.’s circumstances of continued known presence and lack of deportation proceedings that she was PRUCOL.
A similar case, Union County Division of Social Services v. A.P., also
from New Jersey’s Division of Economic Assistance, considered the
PRUCOL eligibility of a Cuban entrant whose one year of parole and I-

447 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005) (noting that the government “concedes
that it is no longer even involved in repatriation negotiations with Cuba”).
448 See Gonzales v. Screws, No. 12-22006-Civ-SEITZ, 2013 WL 943102, at *2 n.7 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 4, 2013) (“[E]xcept for exceedingly rare cases, Cuban nationals are not deported or
removed from the United States.”).
449 S.N. v. Hudson Cty. Div. of Soc. Servs., HPW 3525-99, 1999 WL 1189083, at *1 (N.J.
Adm. Nov. 1, 1999).
450 Id.
451 Id. at *2.
452 Id. at *3.
453 Id.
454 Id.
455 Id.
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94 had long since expired but who had not yet applied for permanent residence or a work permit.456 However, the government had taken no steps
to remove A.P.457 Relying on Holley and Solis, the Division nonetheless
found that “the decision to withhold the removal process” was enough to
confer PRUCOL status.458
Inasmuch as these cases stood for the proposition that Cuban nationals whom the government fails to deport enjoy PRUCOL eligibility, and
to the extent that it was policy that Cuban nationals were not deported,
there was an argument for identifying all Cuban nationals as per se
PRUCOL. While the recent policy change renders this argument moot,
the history of Cubans as a group that enjoyed per se PRUCOL eligibility
lends support to the idea that entire groups of non-citizens may be rendered PRUCOL vis-à-vis official or quasi-official government policies.
5.

Immigration Authority Practice Toward Entire Categories of
Non-Citizens

It is useful to mention Farjam—in which the Southern District of
New York said that an unanswered pending application for Deferred Action conferred PRUCOL eligibility—again, because the Farjam court
also had something to say about categorical PRUCOL eligibility.
The court noted that the SSA’s Administrative Law Judge had held
in a finding undisputed by the SSA’s Appeals Council that “INS has a
long standing policy against enforcing the departure of the infirm, frail
and elderly,” which the plaintiff was.459 The Farjam court thus seemed to
endorse the idea that entire categories of non-citizens such as the frail or
elderly can be considered PRUCOL when there is a practice of deferring
the deportation of that group. Indeed, the government has had a policy for
many years that such cases are non-priority with respect to deciding which
individuals to subject to deportation,460 although this policy by no means
guarantees safety from deportation in every instance.461
456 Union Cty. Div. of Soc. Servs. v. A.P., HPW 9226-00, 2001 WL 307493, at *1 (N.J.
Adm. Mar. 12, 2001).
457 Id.
458 Id. at *3.
459 Farjam v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-94-4486 (CPS), 1995 WL 500477, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995).
460 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 6 (Nov. 20,
2014), https://perma.cc/45YT-LXNP; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Aliens 4-5 (June 17, 2011), https://perma.cc/TL2K-KQDK.
461 See Christine N. Cimini, Hands off Our Fingerprints: State, Local and Individual Defiance of Federal Immigration Enforcement, 47 CONN. L. REV. 101, 107 (2014).
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The Southern District clarified in Farjam that the phrase “does not
contemplate enforcing” does not mean official determination or authorization of the same; rather, it includes non-citizens whose residence in the
U.S. continues by virtue of acquiescence.462 Therefore, to be consistent
with Berger, PRUCOL includes:
[S]cenarios in which INS does not respond to requests . . . yet in
which official acquiescence to an individual’s presence is nevertheless present. Such a situation would be present when INS is
made aware on numerous occasions of the presence of an illegal
alien yet does not take action to enforce the departure.463
Interestingly, parties before the Eastern District of New York in the
case that would become Lewis v. Grinker made arguments that entire
groups of individuals, such as all children and all pregnant women, were
categorically PRUCOL because it was not then the government’s practice
of deporting them.464 Although the reviewing court never reached or ruled
on these arguments for procedural reasons,465 we note this case here because this argument can be useful to advocates who seek to expand
PRUCOL eligibility in their states.
6.

Prima Facie Eligibility for Immigration Relief

Several statutory and regulatory definitions of PRUCOL, currently
and before 1996, include in their definition individuals who have continuously resided in the United States since June 30, 1948, or since January
1, 1972.466 Generally, any non-citizen continually residing in the United
States since January 1, 1972, (and, prior to 1986, since June 30, 1948)467
is eligible to apply for adjustment of status.468 What makes this PRUCOL
category unique is that the people it applies to are PRUCOL by virtue of
462

Farjam, 1995 WL 500477, at *4.
Id. (citation omitted).
464 See Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992).
465 Id. at 1221.
466 See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(13) (2020); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 6-14-111(18)
(2020); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 871-24.60(96)(3)(b)(5) (2020); 10-144-103 ME. CODE R. § 2.25 (LexisNexis 2020); 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 518.003(C)(6) (2020); N.M. CODE R.
§ 8.106.100.7(B)(16)(b)(xiii) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 3603.2(j)(1)(ii)(j) (2020); 55 PA. CODE § 150.1(b)(3)(xiii) (2020).
467 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 203, 100 Stat.
3359, 3405 (“Section 249 (8 U.S.C. 1259) is amended by striking out ‘JUNE 30, 1948’ in the
heading and inserting in lieu thereof ‘JANUARY 1, 1972.’”).
468 See 8 U.S.C. § 1259(a) (1996) (“A record of lawful admission for permanent residence
may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and under such regulations as he may prescribe,
be made in the case of any alien, as of the date of the approval of his application . . . [if] he
establishes that he entered the United States prior to January 1, 1972.”) (emphasis added).
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their prima facie eligibility for some form of immigration relief, and not
because they have applications granted or pending for the same.
The authors could find only one instance of a tribunal accepting the
idea that PRUCOL eligibility is conferred upon those who are prima facie
eligible for some form of immigration relief before they apply for that
relief: In re Barazas, an administrative hearing discussed in Castillo v.
Jackson, accepted this argument.469 In that hearing, a claimant for unemployment benefits argued that before he applied for relief under IRCA, he
was PRUCOL after IRCA’s effective date.470 The administrative judge
agreed with the claimant, finding “that Congress had conferred a special
status on amnesty-eligible aliens and agreed that Barazas was PRUCOL
from IRCA’s effective date even though Barazas was not individually
known to INS until his amnesty claim was filed.”471
IV. WHAT IS PRUCOL ELIGIBILITY WHEN IMMIGRATION RELIEF, SUCH
AS DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS OR TPS, IS GRANTED
BUT LATER RESCINDED?
An era of grave uncertainty in the administration of immigration
laws began in 2016, with the election of Donald Trump as president. On
September 5, 2017, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine C.
Duke issued a memorandum terminating Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (“DACA”),472 which began under the Obama administration as a
means to provide work authorization and a reprieve from deportation.473
The Trump regime alleged that such protection was unlawful: the DHS
now held the view that the DACA program confers a benefit that required
congressional action.474 Thus, the government declared that it was inappropriate for DHS to continue to protect DACA recipients through deferred action.475 The practical implication of this change in policy was that
new DACA applications would not be accepted after September 7, 2017.
Those who were already granted DACA would also not be able to renew
469

See Castillo v. Jackson, 594 N.E.2d 323, 333-34 (Ill. 1992).
Id. at 334.
471 Id.
472 Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children” (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://perma.cc/7YGC-LGFG.
473 Immigrant youth who entered the country before their 16th birthday, had proof of continuous residence, and pursued an education in the United States were granted DACA. See
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children
(June 15, 2012), https://perma.cc/8YUM-RE7V.
474 See Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, supra note 472.
475 Id.
470
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their employment authorization documents and would lose this special
designation that provided some protection against deportation.476 Until
the Supreme Court of the United States restored the DACA program and
rejected the Trump regime’s attempt to end the program,477 USCIS was
not accepting new DACA applications. Only those with DACA applications filed prior to October 5, 2017, were able to renew their work authorizations.478
The termination of the DACA program created ambiguity in states
like New York, where DACA recipients were considered PRUCOL and
thus eligible to receive state-funded Medicaid.479 The question arose as to
whether they would continue to be PRUCOL if the program ended and
recipients no longer had their special designation. Through lobbying efforts called the Coverage 4 All campaign,480 the legal theory and strategy
for which was created by co-author of this article, Sarika Saxena, advocates were able to successfully ensure that DACA recipients will remain
eligible for Medicaid, despite the immigration program’s unknown future.481
Under New York’s regulations setting forth the eligibility requirements for Medical Assistance,482 the first PRUCOL requirement—that the
federal immigration agency know of the individual’s presence—is met
for DACA applicants. Since the DACA application has been granted, it is
proof of the agency’s knowledge. Whether the agency is acquiescing and
not contemplating enforcement, however, requires further analysis.
Courts have found that the policy and practices of the federal immigration agency can be used to determine this element, as in Papadopoulos.483 The Papadopoulos court reasoned that Ms. Papadopoulos satisfied
the PRUCOL requirements because of INS’s operating instructions that
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Id.
See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
Please note that this decision only temporarily restores DACA because it holds that the government improperly terminated the program, laying out a path for them to terminate DACA in
the near future by following the proper motions. Unless there is a change in the presidency, it
is likely that we will lose DACA for good in the near future.
478 See Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, supra note 472.
479 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii)(i) (2020).
480 See #COVERAGE4ALL, https://perma.cc/228X-337F (last visited May 21, 2020).
481 Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Governor, Governor Cuomo Ensures Medicaid Coverage for DACA Recipients Regardless of Federal Action (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://perma.cc/VC6W-2YMB. See also What You Should Know About Applying for or Renewing Your Medicaid Coverage Through N.Y. State of Health if Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Is Rescinded, N.Y. STATE OF HEALTH (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://perma.cc/VQY3-T7JW.
482 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(j)(1)(ii) (2020).
483 See Papadopoulos v. Shang, 414 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154-55 (App. Div. 1979).
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it “would not take any steps to effect deportation of [Ms. Papadopoulos].”484 Currently, USCIS’s policy to refer cases for the initiation of deportation proceedings does not categorically include DACA recipients.485
In fact, USCIS protocol and procedures explicitly state that DACA recipients will not be referred for deportation proceedings.486 Advocates can
argue that DHS’s decision to rescind the executive orders creating DACA
and no longer issuing applications establishes that the agency is acquiescing to the person’s presence. At the very least, it can be argued that a
person’s PRUCOL eligibility extends until it can be demonstrated that the
federal immigration agency would contemplate enforcing the person’s departure.487
Furthermore, the reason given for rescinding the program was based
on a procedural issue and not because DHS believed that DACA recipients were no longer worthy of prosecutorial discretion. Certainly, DHS’s
memorandum rescinding the current program has no bearing on an individual’s likelihood to be removed and whether the immigration agency is
said to be acquiescing to the person’s presence. Deportation proceedings
are initiated based on an individualized, case-by-case analysis. Until an
indication is given that DACA grantees could be removed from the country, typically done through the issuance of an NTA before an immigration
judge, Papadapoulos might be relied upon as authority for the position
that the agency is acquiescing to the individual’s presence and that they
maintain PRUCOL eligibility.
It is important to acknowledge the general nature of immigration enforcement as well. Rescinding or even terminating a form of immigration
relief does not in and of itself initiate any adverse actions against the person, nor does it necessarily indicate the agency’s intent to do so. USCIS,
the immigration agency that adjudicates DACA applications, initiates deportation proceedings refering an applicant to the immigrant court only
in particular scenarios. DHS has established policies and procedures for
circumstances in which to refer a case and serve the applicant with an
NTA, which were last updated on June 28, 2018.488

484

Id. at 154.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Notice to Appear Policy Memorandum,
https://perma.cc/DM6R-LMFE (last updated Feb. 28, 2019).
486 See Frequently Asked Questions: Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/AUK5-A97A.
487 See discussion supra Section III.D.
488 See Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Guidance for the Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices to Appear (NTAs) When Processing a Case Involving
Information Submitted by a Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Requestor in
Connection with a DACA Request or a DACA-Related Benefit Request (Past or Pending) or
Pursuing Termination of DACA (June 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/3UET-SPDP.
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Therefore, in New York, there is at least support for the argument
that, until the federal immigration authority affirmatively puts a person
into deportation proceedings and the person is made aware of such action
being taken against them, the person remains PRUCOL and eligible for
Medicaid. Until an individual Medicaid recipient has been issued an
NTA, as described above, the person is still PRUCOL. Governor
Cuomo’s executive team, along with the New York State Department of
Health, agrees.489
Starting on September 18, 2017, the Trump regime began attacking
the Temporary Protected Status designations of El Salvadoran, Haitian,
Nicaraguan, Sudanese, Nepalese, and Honduran nationals. Despite the
government’s attempts to end TPS designations for these countries, the
programs have thankfully remained in place as the result of litigation.490
However, the question of whether non-citizens who may lose their TPS
designation in the future would be considered PRUCOL after losing that
designation is still unresolved. If the circumstances for DACA recipients
are similar to those with TPS, there is no reason that arguments like the
ones made in Papadapolous would not apply to TPS recipients as they do
to DACA recipients. Given the nature of immigration enforcement, it is
highly probable that the circumstances for ending TPS for certain nationals will mirror that of DACA. In other words, those who have their statuses terminated may receive NTAs thereafter.
V. PUBLIC CHARGE CONCERNS
Non-citizens seeking admission to the United States are deemed inadmissible if the adjudicating DHS or State Department officer has reason
to believe they are likely to become a public charge, i.e. unable to support
themselves financially.491 Those seeking admission include those applying to become legal permanent residents but also some legal permanent
residents returning from abroad.492 The public charge ground of inadmissibility does not apply to those seeking admission subsequent to receiving
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See sources cited supra note 481.
See, e.g., Bhattarai v. Nielsen, No. 19-cv-731-EMC (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 10, 2019);
Casa De Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, No. 18-cv-845-GJH (D. Md. filed Mar. 23, 2018); Saget v.
Trump, No. 18-cv-1599-WFK (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 2018); Ramos v. Nielson, No. 18-cv1554-EMC (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 12, 2018); Centro Presente v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec’y, No.
18-cv-10340-DJC (D. Mass. filed Feb. 22, 2018).
491 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2018).
492 The public charge ground of inadmissibility also applies to those lawful permanent
residents who have traveled abroad and are returning to the United States after an absence of
180 days, or who are returning to the United States after having been convicted of certain
crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (2018).
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humanitarian forms of relief, such as asylum, VAWA, U or T visas, Special Immigrant Juvenile or other Special Immigrant visas, or through other
humanitarian programs such as CAA, NACARA, or HRIFA.493 The adjudicating officer is allowed to consider many factors in determining the
likelihood that the applicant will become a public charge,494 but it is the
experience of the authors that, generally, the past receipt of specific government benefits significantly increases the likelihood that the adjudicating officer will find that the applicant meet the definition of someone who
will become a public charge.495
Critical for the advocate who is advising on the receipt of government assistance by those non-citizens who may seek admission in the future is knowing which programs will trigger the public charge grounds of
inadmissibility and which will not. Up until recently and pursuant to guidance issued on May 26, 1999, such applicants were generally inadmissible
on public charge grounds if they had received public assistance in the
form of cash assistance, such as SSI, TANF, or state-funded cash assistance programs, or long-term in-patient institutional care at government
expense.496 However, on August 14, 2019, DHS issued new regulations
that added federally funded Medicaid (excluding emergency Medicaid
and Medicaid-funded programs for children under 21 years of age and
pregnant people), SNAP, and Section 8 and public housing to this list of
benefits that triggers the public charge ground of inadmissibility.497 This
regulation is currently in effect as this article goes to publication, except
in the Second Circuit where it is currently blocked by federal court injunction;498 however, advocates and several local governments across the
country have filed lawsuits to challenge the regulations as unconstitutional and impermissible and this litigation is ongoing.499

493 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41, 336 (Aug. 14,
2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103, 212, 213, 214, 245 and 248).
494 Id. at 41,298-300.
495 Id. See also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Public Charge Fact Sheet,
https://perma.cc/6ZKK-LCYD (last updated July 31, 2020).
496 See id. at 41,306.
497 Id. at 41,295.
498 Make the Road New York v. Pompeo, --- F. Supp. 3d ---- at *23 (2020 WL 4350731);
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Order No. 20-2537 (August 12, 2020) States
of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al.
(staying the July 29, 2020 injunction issued in Make the Road New York v. Pompeo in all
jurisdictions outside of the Second Circuit).
499 Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19 Civ. 7993 (GBD), 2019 WL 5589072
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019), aff’d, 2019 WL 6498283 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2019), rev’d sub nom.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020); New York v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). See also Public Charge Fact Sheet, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (July 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/LQ9Z-5FQL.
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Practitioners should understand how the public charge bar of inadmissibility affects PRUCOL recipients under both new and former regulations. By definition, no individual designated PRUCOL will be eligible
for those benefits exclusively available to qualified aliens, such as SSI,
TANF, SNAP, Section 8, and federally funded Medicaid,500 so receipt of
these benefits will generally not be of concern to PRUCOL individuals.501
Also not of concern will be the PRUCOL individual’s receipt of statefunded Medicaid, since this is excluded from consideration under both the
old and the new public charge regulations.502 However, state-funded cash
assistance is of the most concern, as it is the main benefit available to
many PRUCOL individuals and will trigger public-charge concerns under
both old and new regulations.503
Also important to understanding when receipt of state-funded cash
assistance benefits will affect a public charge determination is identifying
whether or not the recipient had been “lawfully present” when receiving
the benefit.504 Receipt of state-funded cash assistance will only impact the
public charge determination if the assistance was received when the recipient was out of status. For example, if a New York resident with TPS
receives SNA (the New York cash assistance program) while their TPS
status is active, this will not trigger the public charge bar because the
holder of TPS is considered to be lawfully present. However, if a New
York resident with DACA, or an approved I-130, or a pending application
(to adjust status, for example) receives SNA, this will trigger the public
charge ground of inadmissibility because none of these conditions are
considered a “lawfully present” status by DHS. For this reason, practitioners in jurisdictions with more expansive definitions of PRUCOL and
which afford a more generous provision of cash assistance to PRUCOL
individuals should proceed with the most caution.
Finally, one special group to consider in this analysis are certain lawful permanent residents. Lawful permanent residents who receive their
residence through family members or employers may be deportable if
they use one of those benefits subject to the public charge consideration
500

Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,295 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103, 212, 213, 214, 245 and 248).
501 However, this will be of concern for public charge purposes to those qualified aliens
who are not yet lawful permanent residents but may seek permanent residence in the future
through a family member, such as someone granted parole or withholding of deportation, who
will seek admission in the future. The receipt of certain benefits for legal permanent residents
within the first five years of their residence may also trigger a ground of deportability. See 8
U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2018).
502 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103, 212, 213, 214, 245 and 248).
503 Id.
504 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, supra note 501.
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within their first five years of resident status.505 Such individuals, while
“qualified aliens,” are nonetheless ineligible for federally funded public
benefits.506 However, they are likely entitled to the same state benefits as
other legal permanent residents residing in the same state507 and would
thus be eligible for state-funded Medicaid and cash assistance programs,
which may then trigger this deportability ground. Advising these clients
will require a nuanced understanding of their immigration history in order
to make them aware of the risks and liabilities they may incur from receiving certain benefits.
CONCLUSION
This article has discussed the history of PRUCOL and the decades
of judicial construction and administrative applications that have framed
its moving boundaries. Immigration regulations and the exercise of discretion by immigration authorities are fluid and far from static institutions. PRUCOL was created and evolved with this reality in mind. Congress intended—and the courts have reaffirmed—that the phrase is to be
interpreted broadly and flexibly to fit this reality. This can and should be
used to expand the term’s capacity to provide access to otherwise undocumented residents with public assistance.
Inasmuch as the practice of law involves the identification and use
of a rule’s ambiguity in furtherance of your client’s interests, the
PRUCOL doctrine offers plenty of opportunity to make the law work for
your client. In jurisdictions where PRUCOL is still good law, there is
room to push the boundaries of who is included within its pliable definition. Practitioners, and in particular those institutions with the capacity
for impact litigation, should look to the arguments advanced in cases like
Cruz, Shibayama, and In re Barazas for inspiration and authority to bring
new immigration circumstances under the PRUCOL umbrella.
The hope is that this discussion can provide practitioners not just
with the tools and taxonomy to identify conventional PRUCOL arguments (e.g., for clients with deferred action or pending asylum applications), but also to encourage and support advocacy for the recognition of
less traditional PRUCOL categories (e.g., for undocumented children or
clients in deportation proceedings). Ultimately, expanding our knowledge
and understanding of the PRUCOL doctrine may help thousands access
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8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2018).
Id.

See e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971)(holding that “a state
statute that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to
aliens who have not resided in the United States for a specified number of years
violate the Equal Protection Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment].”)
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life-saving public assistance and insurance in jurisdictions across several
states.

